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The Mapmaker’s Dilemma in               
Evaluating High-End Inequality 
DANIEL SHAVIRO* 
The last thirty years have witnessed rising income and 
wealth concentration among the top 0.1% of the population, 
leading to intense political debate regarding how, if at all, 
policymakers should respond. Often, this debate emphasizes 
the tools of public economics, and in particular optimal in-
come taxation. However, while these tools can help us in 
evaluating the issues raised by high-end inequality, their ex-
treme reductionism—which, in other settings, often offers 
significant analytic payoffs—here proves to have serious 
drawbacks. This Article addresses what we do and don’t 
learn from the optimal income tax literature regarding high-
end inequality, and what other inputs might be needed to 
help one evaluate the relevant issues. 
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INTRODUCTION 
“According to an old joke, a statistician whose head was on fire, 
while his feet were encased in a block of ice, reported that, on aver-
age, he was very comfortable.”1 This mythical individual brings to 
mind the Italian statistician Corrado Gini, who devised the famous 
                                                                                                             
 1 Daniel Shaviro, Book Review, 68 Nat’l Tax J. 681, 681 (2015) [hereinafter 
Shaviro, Book Review] (reviewing Edward D. Kleinbard, WE ARE BETTER THAN 
THIS: HOW GOVERNMENT SHOULD SPEND OUR MONEY (2014)). 
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Gini coefficient,2 measuring statistical divergence from a perfectly 
equal distribution of, say, wealth or income.3 Gini not only created 
the measure that bears his name, but also urged that it be used to 
express numerically the extent of a given society’s material inequal-
ity.4 
The two cases admittedly differ in an important respect. As I 
have noted elsewhere: 
[T]he problem Gini missed relates to interpretation, 
rather than measurement. Under Gini’s coefficient, 
extreme inequality at both the top and the bottom of 
the social scale will not statistically offset each other, 
[yield]ing [] a false reading of zero aggregate in-
equality, along the lines of the fire-and-ice example. 
Instead, each will raise the quantum of inequality that 
the measure detects. [Yet], the coefficient still has the 
defect of amalgamating two normatively distinct 
phenomena in a single [numerical expression].”5 
By wholly amalgamating low-end inequality and high-end in-
equality, the Gini coefficient risks creating as much confusion, or at 
least conflation between distinct issues, as it does enlightenment. 
Consider first low-end inequality, or poverty as measured relative to 
the median in a given society. It matters because, if some people are 
worse off than the rest of us, basic human beneficence supports try-
ing to help them.6 Now, how we can best do this is controversial.7 
And, to those of a sufficiently libertarian bent—who emphasize per-
sonal responsibility in terms of moral desert, even when the poor 
could be aided without significant adverse behavioral effects—the 
question of whether we should help them may seem less clear than 
it does to me.8 But the fact that addressing low-end inequality, if it 
                                                                                                             
 2 Id. 
 3 See Alan J. Auerbach & Kevin A. Hassett, Tax Policy and Horizontal Eq-
uity, in INEQUALITY AND TAX POLICY 44, 47 (2013). 
 4 Id. 
 5 Shaviro, Book Review, supra note 1, at 681. 
 6 Id. 
 7 See generally Emmanuel Saez & Gabriel Zucman, Wealth Inequality in the 
United States Since 1913: Evidence from Capitalized Income Tax Data, 131 Q. J. 
ECON. 519 (2016). 
 8 See id. 
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can be done right, involves helping people who are worse off than 
the rest of us makes it a relatively easy project to embrace.9 
High-end inequality, or that pertaining to the super-rich, is dif-
ferent.10 Would the idea, in addressing it, be just to make very rich 
people worse off, even if no one else gains as a result? From the 
standpoint of beneficence, why would we want to do that? Thus, the 
view that we should seek to reduce high-end inequality is easiest to 
embrace if it has harmful effects on people below the highest mate-
rial level.11 
In evaluating whether and why this might be so, we should keep 
in mind what high-end inequality in the United States and peer so-
cieties actually looks like at present.12 Over the last thirty years, 
wealth and income concentration at the very top have been dramat-
ically increasing, and have already reached levels unknown since 
before World War I.13 However, this has been almost entirely due to 
the rise of people in the top 0.1% in the wealth distribution, who 
held only 7% of the U.S. national total in 1978, but by 2012 held 
22%.14 
Given this degree of high-end wealth concentration, the com-
mon practice of speaking about the “1 percent” versus the “99 per-
cent” actually misses the point.15 The 0.1% have even been pulling 
away from the 1%—and, for that matter, the 0.01% have been pull-
ing away from the 0.1%, and the 0.001% from the 0.01%, in a pro-
cess that economists call “fractal inequality.”16 Just as one finds “the 
                                                                                                             
 9 Shaviro, Book Review, supra note 1, at 681. 
 10 See id. 
 11 See Scott Winship, Wait a Second, We Are the 99.9999%, BROOKINGS 
(Apr. 10, 2012), https://www.brookings.edu/opinions/wait-a-second-we-are-the-
99-9999/. 
 12 See Drew Desilver, 5 Facts About Economic Inequality, PEW RES. CTR. 
(Jan. 7, 2014), http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2014/01/07/5-facts-about-
economic-inequality/. 
 13 See Saez & Zucman, supra note 7, at 519. 
 14 See id. 
 15 See Derek Thompson, How You, I, and Everyone Got the Top 1 Percent 
All Wrong, THE ATLANTIC (Mar. 30, 2014), http://www.theatlantic.com/business
/archive/2014/03/how-you-i-and-everyone-got-the-top-1-percent-all-
wrong/359862/. 
 16 Annie Lowrey, Even Among the Richest of the Rich, Fortunes Diverge, 
N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 10, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/02/11/your-money/e
ven-among-the-richest-of-the-rich-fortunes-diverge.html. 
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same amount of ‘jaggedness’ or ‘unevenness’ at every scale” in a 
fractal,17 such as a snowflake, so, too, in data covering the last few 
decades, “one sees the pattern of growing inequality among the pop-
ulation as a whole replicated within any subgroup of that popula-
tion  . . . .”18 
There are a number of different grounds on which high-end in-
equality, when so sharply concentrated at the very top of the distri-
bution, may be bad for everyone else.19 For example, it may lead to 
plutocratic capture of the political system by the super-rich, enabling 
them to extract rents and greatly reduce the system’s responsiveness 
to all others’ interests.20 Extreme high-end income and wealth con-
centration may also reduce economic stability, output, and growth.21 
Claims to this effect call for conventional “hard” social science re-
search,22 which has indeed been ongoing, albeit well short of reach-
ing consensus.23 
However, the rise of the 0.1% also raises a set of subtler, more 
intangible issues that require different modes of assessment.24 We 
are an intensely social species, and often a rivalrous one, prone to 
                                                                                                             
 17 William Easterly, Beautiful fractals and ugly inequality, AIDWATCH BLOG 
(Sep. 8, 2010), http://aidwatchers.com/2010/09/beautiful-fractals-and-ugly-in-eq
uality. 
 18 PAUL KRUGMAN, PEDDLING PROSPERITY: ECONOMIC SENSE AND 
NONSENSE IN THE AGE OF DIMINISHED EXPECTATIONS 133 (1994). 
 19 See generally T.M. Scanlon, The 4 biggest reasons why inequality is bad 
for society, TED IDEAS (Jun. 3, 2014). http://ideas.ted.com/the-4-biggest-reasons-
why-inequality-is-bad-for-society/ (discussing four reasons why high-end ine-
quality may be bad for society). 
 20 See LARRY M. BARTELS, UNEQUAL DEMOCRACY: THE POLITICAL 
ECONOMY OF THE NEW GILDED AGE 257, 259–60 (2010); MARTIN GILENS, 
AFFLUENCE AND INFLUENCE: ECONOMIC INEQUALITY AND POLITICAL POWER IN 
AMERICA 234 (2012). 
 21 See JOSEPH E. STIGLITZ, THE PRICE OF INEQUALITY: HOW TODAY’S 
DIVIDED SOCIETY ENDANGERS OUR FUTURE 106 (2013). 
 22 “Hard” social science research, such as that in economics and related dis-
ciplines, can be defined as that which relies on “theory, mathematics, rigorous 
methods, falsifiability, and replicability” in emulation of the physical sciences. 
Loren Graham & Jean-Michel Kantor, “Soft” Area Studies versus “Hard” Social 
Science: A False Opposition, 66 SLAVIC REV., no. 1, Spring 2007, at 1. 
 23 Id. 
 24 See Josh Bivens, Debating the Rise of the Top 1 Percent, ECON. POL’Y 
INST. (Jun. 20, 2013, 2:18 PM), http://www.epi.org/blog/debating-rise-top-1-per-
cent-incomes/. 
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measuring ourselves in terms of others, and often directly against 
others. People thus “have deep-seated psychological responses to 
inequality and social hierarchy,” creating the potential for extreme 
wealth differences to “invoke[] feelings of superiority and inferior-
ity, dominance and subordination” that powerfully “affect[] the way 
we relate to and treat each other.”25 
In one view, this causes extreme inequality to be akin to pollu-
tion.26 According to recent research by British social scientists Rich-
ard Wilkinson and Kate Pickett, high-end wealth concentration does 
not just reduce happiness for all groups—the rich as well as the 
poor27—but even has measurable adverse effects on social trust, 
economic mobility, life expectancy, infant mortality, children’s ed-
ucational performance, teenage births, homicides and other vio-
lence, imprisonment rates, mental illness, drug and alcohol addic-
tion, and obesity.28 While these claims likewise fall within the hard 
social science realm, at present they remain fiercely disputed.29 
However that debate proceeds, it cannot entirely resolve the psy-
chological and moral issues that inequality raises. How deeply and 
widely felt are the sentiments of superiority and inferiority, or dom-
inance and subordination? How unhappy do they make people, and 
is the pain at the bottom greater than the pleasure (if such it is) at the 
top? Are unequal power relationships morally objectionable for their 
own sake, even if people grow accustomed to and even comfortable 
                                                                                                             
 25 Richard Wilkinson & Kate Pickett, The Spirit Level authors: why society 
is more unequal than ever, THE GUARDIAN (Mar. 9, 2014), https://www.theguard-
ian.com/commentisfree/2014/mar/09/society-unequal-the-spirit-level (discussing 
RICHARD WILKINSON & KATE PICKETT, THE SPIRIT LEVEL: WHY GREATER 
EQUALITY MAKES SOCIETIES STRONGER (2010) [hereinafter WILKINSON & 
PICKETT, The Spirit Level]). 
 26 See S.V. Subramanian & Ichiro Kawachi, Whose Health is Affected by In-
come Inequality? A Multilevel Interaction Analysis of Contemporaneous and 
Lagged Effects of State Income Inequality on Individual Self-Rated Health in the 
United States, 12 HEALTH & PLACE 141, 149 (2006). 
 27 See WILKINSON & PICKETT, THE SPIRIT LEVEL, supra note 25 (“The effects 
of inequality are not confined to the poor. A growing body of research shows that 
inequality damages the social fabric of the whole society.”). 
 28 See WILKINSON & PICKETT, THE SPIRIT LEVEL, supra note 25, at 19. 
 29 See, e.g., CHRISTOPHER SNOWDON, THE SPIRIT LEVEL DELUSION: FACT-
CHECKING THE LEFT’S NEW THEORY OF EVERYTHING 9–12 (2010) (critiquing 
WILKINSON & PICKETT, THE SPIRIT LEVEL, supra note 25). 
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with them? And if people in the 99.9% feel diminished by the eco-
nomic gulf between themselves and those at the top, is this just a 
matter of socially destructive “bitterness” and “begrudg[ing] others 
[of] their prosperity”30 that policymakers ought to ignore? Or does 
it offer legitimate and important grounds for seeking to reduce high-
end inequality? 
In order to evaluate such issues, one needs to go outside the 
boundaries of conventional hard social science research—and in 
particular those of public economics. The problem in those realms 
is not, in the main, one of ideological bias in any particular direction. 
Public economics methodologies can be—and have been—de-
ployed on both sides of the debate regarding whether we should en-
ergetically address high-end inequality.31 The problem, rather, is 
that methodological tunnel vision—while adopted by economists 
for good reasons, and yielding high intellectual payoffs in many set-
tings—has negative payoffs, unless duly supplemented, in this set-
ting. 
This article therefore seeks to advance understanding of the fol-
lowing questions: 
1. What do we learn, or fail to learn, from the public 
economics literature regarding high-end income and 
wealth inequality? 
2. Why do even such seemingly technical issues as 
the income tax rate structure at the top depend on is-
sues that are not entirely illuminated by standard eco-
nomic analysis? 
3. What features of public economics as a discipline 
have produced both its triumphs and the limits to its 
usefulness? 
                                                                                                             
 30 Arthur C. Brooks, The Downside of Inciting Envy, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 1, 
2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/03/02/opinion/sunday/the-downside-of-in-
citing-envy.html?partner=rssnyt&emc=rss&_r=1. 
 31 See Peter Diamond & Emmanuel Saez, The Case for a Progressive Tax: 
From Basic Research to Policy Recommendations, 25 J. ECON. PERSP. 165, 184 
(2011) (describing different public economic methodologies); N. Gregory 
Mankiw, Matthew Weinzierl, & Danny Yagan, Optimal Taxation in Theory and 
Practice, 23 J. ECON. PERSP. 147, 147–48 (2009). 
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Section I sets forth what I call the “Mapmaker’s Dilemma,” 
which helps explain why modern economic analysis has achieved 
such wide-ranging intellectual triumphs, yet will prove inadequate 
as an all-in-one touchstone for analyzing high-end inequality. Sec-
tion II discusses the crucial role of a very simple and indeed sim-
plistic notion of “utility” in standard economic analysis. Section III 
discusses optimal income taxation, the main tool offered by modern 
public economics for the analysis of high-end—as well as low-
end—inequality, and then offers a brief conclusion. 
I. THE MAPMAKER’S DILEMMA 
Economists and other social scientists, like mapmakers, aim to 
provide models of some part or aspect of the world.32 These models 
must combine being reasonably accurate with being sufficiently us-
able and useful.33 Unfortunately, these two objectives are often in 
direct conflict.34 Hence, economists who are studying real world so-
cial or economic phenomena, such as high-end inequality, face a 
version of what I call the “Mapmaker’s Dilemma.”35 That is, they 
must choose between how much accuracy, as opposed to how much 
usability, they are willing to sacrifice.36 
Leave it to Lewis Carroll to have identified one very clear and 
clean response to the Mapmaker’s Dilemma.37 In Sylvie and Bruno 
Concluded—the second volume of a kind of follow-up to the Alice 
books that strews gleaming, beautiful diamonds of Carroll’s delight-
fully hyperlogical nonsense amid gobs of gooey, indigestible senti-
ment—a mysterious visitor from a foreign land or world, known 
only as Mein Herr, asks the narrator: 
“What do you consider the largest map that would be 
really useful?” 
                                                                                                             
 32 See generally Kevin D. Williamson, The Mapmakers’ Dilemma, NAT’L 
REV. (May 1, 2014, 4:00 AM), http://www.nationalreview.com/article/376946/m
apmakers-dilemma-kevin-d-williamson. 
 33 See id. 
 34 See id. 
 35 See id. 
 36 See id. 
 37 See LEWIS CARROLL, SYLVIE AND BRUNO CONCLUDED 169 (1893). 
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“About six inches to the mile.” 
“Only six inches!” exclaimed Mein Herr. “We very 
soon got to six yards to the mile. Then we tried a 
hundred yards to the mile. And then came the grand-
est idea of all! We actually made a map of the coun-
try, on the scale of a mile to the mile!” 
“Have you used it much?” I enquired. 
“It has never been spread out, yet,” said Mein Herr: 
“the farmers objected: they said it would cover the 
whole country, and shut out the sunlight! So we now 
use the country itself, as its own map, and I assure 
you it does nearly as well.”38 
Jorge Luis Borges apparently liked this passage enough to use it 
as the inspiration for a one-paragraph short story, fittingly named 
“On Exactitude in Science.”39 There, he carries the narrative a step 
further. In a great empire somewhere, “the Cartographers Guilds 
struck a Map of the Empire whose size was that of the Empire, and 
which coincided point for point with it.”40 Succeeding generations, 
however, found this map so “cumbersome” that, “not without irrev-
erence,” they “abandoned it to the Rigours of sun and Rain. In the 
western deserts, tattered fragments of the Map are still to be found, 
sheltering an occasional Beast or beggar; in the whole Nation, no 
other relic is left of the Discipline of Geography.”41 
The Mapmaker’s Dilemma has two distinct elements. First, min-
iaturization inevitably means loss of local detail.42 Second, usable 
maps must generally be flat, but the Earth is spheroid.43 While this 
hardly matters when the scale is sufficiently small, for maps of the 
                                                                                                             
 38 CARROLL, supra note 37, at 169 (emphasis in original). 
 39 See JORGE LUIS BORGES, On Exactitude in Science, in COLLECTED 
FICTIONS 325, 325 (Andrew Hurley trans.) (1998). 
 40 Id. 
 41 Id. 
 42 See Williamson, supra note 32. 
 43 See Jerry Brotton, A History of the World in Twelve Maps, TIME (Nov. 15, 
2013), http://ideas.time.com/2013/11/21/a-history-of-the-world-in-twelve-maps
/slide/gerard-mercator-world-map-1569. 
92 UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW [Vol. 71:83 
 
entire world it leads to significant distortion.44 Different regions’ 
shapes or relative sizes must be misrepresented, for the same reason 
that one cannot simply flatten out the skin of an orange.45 This offers 
considerable scope to choose the distortions that one finds person-
ally most amenable, and then perhaps to forget that they are distor-
tions.46 Perhaps it is not entirely coincidental that North Americans 
and Europeans still commonly use the Mercator projection 
method,47 dating back to 1569, which—while offering accurate 
shapes for the world’s large landmasses—greatly exaggerates the 
northern continents’ sizes relative to those of Africa and South 
America.48 
Economists, like real world mapmakers and unlike Mein Herr’s 
countrymen or Borges’ Cartographers Guild, have leaned towards 
usability—albeit inevitably at the expense of perfect accuracy.49 
This has served the field well.50 The rise of modern economics to 
the top of the academic pecking order reflects its many great tri-
umphs in showing just how much one can explain by using very 
simple behavioral models that employ crudely reductive assump-
tions regarding human motivation.51 Just as with maps, however, 
this comes at the dual cost of losing detail and flattening the under-
lying reality.52 Moreover, just as with maps, the flattening—in the 
                                                                                                             
 44 See Ellie Zolfagharifard, Why every world map you’re looking at is 
WRONG: Africa, China and India are distorted despite access to accurate satel-
lite data, DAILY MAIL (Apr. 4, 2014), http://www.dailymail.co.uk/sciencetech/ar-
ticle-2596783/Why-world-map-youre-looking-WRONG-Africa-China-Mexico-
distorted-despite-access-accurate-satellite-data.html. 
 45 See Zolfagharifard, supra note 44. 
 46 See id. 
 47 See Brotton, supra note 43. 
 48 Id. 
 49 See Sam Ouliaris, Economic Models: Simulations of Reality, INT’L 
MONETARY FUND (Mar. 28, 2012), http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/fandd/b
asics/models.htm (“An economic model is a simplified description of reality, de-
signed to yield hypotheses about economic behavior that can be tested.”). See also 
BORGES, supra note 39, at 325; CARROLL, supra note 37, at 169. 
 50 See Ouliaris, supra note 49. 
 51 See generally ALFRED MARSHALL, PRINCIPLES OF ECONOMICS: AN 
INTRODUCTORY VOLUME 92 (8th ed. 1920). 
 52 See generally David H. Freedman, Why Economic Models Are Always 
Wrong, SCIENTIFIC AMERICAN (Oct. 26, 2011), http://www.scientificamerican.
com/article/finance-why-economic-models-are-always-wrong/ (explaining that 
economic models are often wrong due to inaccuracies in the calibration models). 
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sense of actually distorting important motivational inputs to behav-
ior, not just simplifying them—matters more for a large-scale issue, 
such as the social evaluation of high-end inequality, than it does for 
a small one, such as understanding how equilibrium emerges in the 
market for vanilla beans or canola oil.53 
The intellectual progress that economists have made by pursuing 
very simple models speaks for itself as validation of their choice in 
responding to the Mapmaker’s Dilemma.54 The danger, however, is 
that immersion in such models can lead one to forget the distortions 
and inaccuracy in cases where these are highly relevant.55 Still, the 
upshot is not that conventional economic analysis of high-end in-
equality should be abandoned, like geography in Borges’ fictional 
empire by reason of its more extreme and opposite response to the 
Mapmaker’s Dilemma.56 Rather, the point is that we should remem-
ber to supplement the standard economic model, addressing its most 
important omissions and rounding it out as needed. 
II. THE ROLE IN ECONOMIC MODELS OF “UTILITY” 
A. An Underlying Ambiguity 
In evaluating how policymakers might respond to high-end in-
equality, the most pertinent economic literature is that found in op-
timal income taxation, straddling public economics and welfare eco-
nomics.57 However, before explaining the basics of how this litera-
ture approaches the issue, I will set the stage a bit by delineating and 
critiquing some of its key underlying methodological and normative 
assumptions. 
Economists like micro-foundations.58 For example, since a soci-
ety consists of individuals, economists generally prefer to start their 
analyses of market and other social interactions by building up from 
                                                                                                             
 53 See Daniel M. Hausman, Philosophy of Economics, STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA 
OF PHIL. (Edward N. Zalta ed., Sept. 12, 2003), http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/
economics/ (section 4.4 considering the scrutiny economics has undergone 
throughout history). 
 54 See Williamson, supra note 32. 
 55 See Freedman, supra note 52. 
 56 See BORGES, supra note 39, at 325. 
 57 See generally, e.g., Mankiw et al., supra note 31, at 147–48. 
 58 Jérémie Cohen-Setton, Microfoundations in Macroeconomics, BRUEGEL 
(Mar. 9, 2012), http://bruegel.org/2012/03/microfoundations-in-macroeconom-
ics/. 
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a model of individual behavior.59 This involves making assumptions 
regarding not just how, but to a certain extent why, a given individ-
ual makes the choices that shape her actions.60 
In the basic model that underlies not just public economics and 
welfare economics, but also price theory, which explores how mar-
kets operate, each individual has a utility function that we do not try 
to explain.61 It is just there. A utility function is a “mathematical 
function representing an individual’s set of preferences, which 
translates her well-being from different consumption bundles into 
units that can be compared in order to determine choice.”62 
Just what and how much is being assumed or claimed by using 
utility functions is both contested and slippery.63 Moreover, just how 
much one needs to claim varies with the context.64 For example, we 
will see that when using optimal income taxation to evaluate high-
end inequality, one needs to make more capacious claims about util-
ity than when using price theory to model how the price of canola 
oil is set in a perfectly competitive market.65 
The core ambiguity can be seen in the definition that I quoted 
above, which mentions both “well-being” and “choice.”66 Of these 
two terms, choice is much easier to observe. Other people may see 
what I do, but they can only try to infer how I feel. But psychic well-
being—however one ends up defining it—has more obvious norma-
tive significance. If I care about my own well-being and extend this 
concern to others—either from beneficence, or intellectual ac-
ceptance of their similarity and moral equivalence to me—then I 
will also care about others’ well-being, but not necessarily about 
                                                                                                             
 59 See JONATHAN GRUBER, PUBLIC FINANCE AND PUBLIC POLICY G-11 (4th 
ed. 2013). 
 60 See MARSHALL, supra note 51, at 92. 
 61 See generally Puneet Prakash, Risk Attitudes: Expected Utility Theory and 
Demand for Hedging, in ENTERPRISE AND INDIVIDUAL RISK MANAGEMENT 96–
99 (2012). 
 62 GRUBER, supra note 59. 
 63 See generally Geoffrey M. Hodgson, On the Limits of Rational Choice 
Theory, 1 ECON. THOUGHT 94 (2012). 
 64 Id. 
 65 See J.A. Mirrlees, An Exploration in the Theory of Optimum Income Tax-
ation, 38 REV. ECON. STUD. 175, 175 (1971). 
 66 GRUBER, supra note 59. 
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their choices, other than as instrumental to achieving their well-be-
ing.67 
The dichotomy between well-being and choice has been well 
understood in economics for a long time.68 For example, Alfred 
Marshall noted that, while “[u]tility is taken to be correlative to De-
sire or Want . . . desires cannot be measured directly, but only indi-
rectly by the outward phenomena to which they give rise . . . .”69 
Thus, he took comfort in the fact that, “in those cases with which 
economics is chiefly concerned the measure is found in the price 
which a person is willing to pay for the fulfillment or satisfaction of 
his desire.”70 
Since Marshall’s time, however, economics has been on a wide-
ranging imperialist binge.71 It now looks far beyond the study of 
commodity markets and international trade to explore, for example, 
racial discrimination, drug addiction, marriage markets, dating strat-
egies, and the right to privacy.72 Even by Marshall’s time, welfare 
economics had emerged, purporting to offer tools for the evaluation 
of aggregate social welfare.73 This commonly involves defining so-
cial welfare as a positive function of the psychic welfare that the 
members of a society would experience under different circum-
stances, such as the adoption of alternative government policies.74 
Marshall’s way out of the maze, which was to focus on “the price 
which a person is willing to pay for the fulfillment or satisfaction of 
his desire,”75 was later expanded and formalized by Paul Samuelson 
                                                                                                             
 67 One can, of course, adopt if one likes an ethical framework that posits car-
ing about choice for its own sake, and not about wellbeing. This, however, is not 
the predominant methodological approach in economics (nor does it jibe with my 
personal views). 
 68 See, e.g., Sandeep Gautam, Choice and Well-being, PSYCHOL. TODAY 
(Nov. 6, 2012), https://www.psychologytoday.com/blog/the-fundamental-four/20
1211/choice-and-well-being. 
 69 MARSHALL, supra note 51, at 92. 
 70 Id. 
 71 See Edward P. Lazear, Economic Imperialism, 115 Q.J. ECON. 99, 103 
(2000). 
 72 See id. 
 73 See Welfare Economics, ENCYCLOPÆDIA BRITANNICA, https://www.britan
nica.com/topic/welfare-economics. 
 74 See id. 
 75 MARSHALL, supra note 51, at 92. 
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via the theory of revealed preference.76 Samuelson argued that con-
sumer models could be “freed from any vestigial traces of the utility 
concept”77 by relying on “the amounts of n economic goods which 
will be purchased per unit time by an individual faced with the prices 
of these goods and with a given total expenditure.”78 In other words, 
consumer choices, which at least in principle could be directly ob-
served, were generally sufficient for economic analysis without 
there being any need to worry about psychic underpinnings that 
could neither be directly observed nor compared to each other.79 
What perils were Marshall and Samuelson so understandably ea-
ger to avoid? One way to show this is by setting forth a maximally 
capacious version of the concepts of utility and utility functions.80 
A “mapmaker” in economics whose inclinations were opposite to 
those of Mein Herr’s countrymen and Borges’ Cartographers 
Guild—opting for maximum usability, rather than accuracy—might 
be tempted to posit the following: Given your underlying prefer-
ences, your mental state under any particular circumstances will al-
ways have a quantifiable hedonic utility score in terms of the sensa-
tions that you experience of happiness, contentment, pleasure, ab-
sence of distress, and so forth.81 The higher your score—that is, the 
more “utiles,” or units of utility, you feel—the happier or better-off 
you are.82 
In short, rather than assuming a can-opener, as per the old joke 
about the economist on a desert island who wants to open a can of 
                                                                                                             
 76 See STANLEY WONG, FOUNDATIONS OF PAUL SAMUELSON’S REVEALED 
PREFERENCE THEORY 17 (rev. ed. 2006); see generally P.A. Samuelson, A Note 
on the Pure Theory of Consumer’s Behaviour, 5 ECONOMICA 61 (1938). 
 77 Samuelson, supra note 76, at 71. 
 78 Id. at 62. 
 79 See id. at 61–62. 
 80 See generally, e.g., DAVID J. CHALMERS, THE CONSCIOUS MIND: IN 
SEARCH OF A FUNDAMENTAL THEORY 293–97 (1997). 
 81 See Legal Theory Lexicon 060: Efficiency, Pareto, and Kaldor-Hicks, 
LEGAL THEORY LEXICON (Oct. 9, 2006), http://lsolum.typepad.com/legal_theor
y_lexicon/law_and_economics/ [hereinafter Legal Theory Lexicon 060] (last rev. 
Aug. 30, 2015). Obviously, the difficulty of saying just what this utility is testifies 
eloquently to the underlying problem. See id. 
 82 See id. 
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food with no implements,83 the maximally capacious approach in-
volves assuming a utilometer. This might be defined as a determi-
nate quantitative gauge controlling the individual’s behavior, and 
perhaps that she can even read.84 
A utilometer would certainly be a most convenient thing to have 
in practice, at least if it was sufficiently cheap and easy to operate. 
But despite its absurdity when described bluntly, the state of affairs 
that it posits is not completely ridiculous—just partially so. If you 
had an internal utilometer that you could read, along with enough 
information about the world, it would empower you to rank all of 
your choices—concerning, say, how much to work, where to live, 
and what consumer items to buy. What is more, you would be able 
to rank them not just ordinally, or from best to worst, but also cardi-
nally, or in terms of your degrees of relative preference.85 In actual-
ity, we can often do at least a rough small bit of this.86 For example, 
you may know not just that you prefer pizza to pork chops, and pork 
chops to going to the dentist, but also that you regard the first of 
these two choices as presenting a much closer call than the second 
one. 
While the internal or introspective objections to positing             
utilometers are bad enough, economists have tended to worry more 
about the external or evidentiary set of problems.87 This worry re-
flects the fact that, while we all have at least some direct experiential 
access to our own mental states, other people’s feelings—and utility, 
insofar as there is such a thing—can only be indirectly inferred.88 
                                                                                                             
 83 On a Desert Island, with Soup, HARV. U. PRESS BLOG (Apr. 6, 2012), 
http://harvardpress.typepad.com/hup_publicity/2012/04/on-a-desert-island-with-
soup-schlefer-assumptions-economists-make.html. 
 84 Lewis Sage, At Last a Utilometer?, BALDWIN WALLACE U. DEPT. ECON. 
BLOG (Jan. 4, 2012), http://bwecon.blogspot.com/2012/01/at-last-utilometer.ht
ml. 
 85 J. Singh, Consumer’s Behaviour: Cardinal Utility Analysis (Explained 
With Diagram), ECON. DISCUSSION http://www.economicsdiscussion.net/cardi-
nal-utility-analysis/consumers-behaviour-cardinal-utility-analysis-explained-wit
h-diagram/1111 (last visited Aug. 22, 2016). 
 86 Id. 
 87 Singh, supra note 85. 
 88 See David Brink, Mill’s Moral and Political Philosophy, STAN. 
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHIL. (Oct. 9, 2007), http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/mill-mo
ral-political/ (last rev. Aug. 22, 2014); Singh, supra note 85. 
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Hence, even if one does not worry too much about the “zombie prob-
lem” in moral philosophy—involving the possibility that, while I 
(the observer) know that I actually feel things such as pleasure and 
pain, other seemingly sentient beings may merely look as if they 
do89—we face the apparent impossibility of making interpersonal 
utility comparisons.90 Who can say, for example, how great my sub-
jective enjoyment of pizza or pork chops actually is, or my distress 
from going to the dentist, as compared to that of my neighbor, even 
if, in the same circumstances, we make exactly the same choices and 
even express ourselves identically? 
This is where revealed preferences were thought to come to the 
rescue.91 If both you and I would pay up to $20 for a pizza, and up 
to $15 for a pork chop, why not treat that as effectively the measure 
of the utility we each would derive from each item? “Desire or 
Want,” then, if invoked at all, might simply be placeholders for the 
unknown and irrelevant underlying processes, conscious or not, that 
presumably generated the visible exercise of choice.92 Under such a 
view, it might simply be linguistically convenient to say, as short-
hand, that the pizza’s utility to each of us equaled $20. 
Unfortunately for the use of revealed preferences, much evi-
dence now shows that people often do not make consistent choices 
                                                                                                             
 89 See, e.g., Robert Kirk, Zombies, STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHIL. (Oct. 9, 
2006), http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2009/entries/zombies (“Zombies are 
exactly like us in all physical respects but have no conscious experiences: by def-
inition there is ‘nothing it is like’ to be a zombie. Yet zombies behave like us, and 
some even spend a lot of time discussing consciousness. This disconcerting fan-
tasy helps to make the problem of phenomenal consciousness vivid, especially as 
a problem for physicalism.”). 
 90 See David Henderson, Tyler Cowen on Interpersonal Utility Comparisons, 
LIBR. ECON. & LIBERTY (May 20, 2015) http://econlog.econlib.org/archives/201
5/05/tyler_cowen_on_14.html. 
 91 See B. Douglas Bernheim & Antonio Rangel, Behavioral Public Econom-
ics: Welfare and Policy Analysis with Non-Standard Decision Makers 2 (Nat’l 
Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 11518, 2005). 
 92 See, e.g., MARSHALL, supra note 51, at 92. Analogously, when discussing 
biological evolution, it may be convenient to use teleological language as short-
hand, without one’s meaning to suggest that anything beyond blind processes is 
at work. An example would be saying that the “reason” our ancestors became 
bipeds is that it freed up their hands for other uses. One who said this might simply 
mean that positive natural selection for bipedalism was driven predominantly by 
the advantages associated with having free hands. 
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as expressed in terms of price.93 But even if people invariably ex-
pressed consistent valuations, the effort to substitute choice for util-
ity would fare better with respect to some types of economic inquiry 
than others. 
Thus, suppose one is observing a computer simulation of a mar-
ketplace with buyers and sellers, featuring interactions between 
“characters” that follow complicated algorithms but are no more 
sensate than a thermostat. For price theory, this would be good 
enough to generate testable empirical propositions.94 One could 
even use it, in this setting, to detect “inefficiency” in the simulated 
market’s operations. Thus, suppose that one of the characters was 
“willing” to pay up to $20 for an item that another was “willing” to 
sell for as little as $18, but that the transaction did not take place 
because the simulation required payment of a $5 “tax.” This is a 
classic example of tax-induced deadweight loss.95 Defined in terms 
of the characters’ price points, the transaction would have generated 
$2 of surplus, if only it could have taken place.96 That is, but for the 
tax, the buyer would have gotten something it “valued” at $20, and 
that the seller “disvalued” at only $18.97 What is more, there would 
not, in this instance, have been any “tax revenue” generated.98 
Yet, there would be no reason for us to care whether the charac-
ters in the computer simulation were getting the things that they 
(acted as if they) “wanted.” If we operate from a principle of benef-
icence99—generalizing from our own feelings to ascribe feelings 
that have similar moral importance to other, apparently comparably 
                                                                                                             
 93 See, e.g., Bernheim & Rangel, supra note 91, at 20–21. 
 94 See, e.g., MARSHALL, supra note 51, at 92. 
 95 See generally Martin Feldstein, Tax Avoidance and the Deadweight Loss 
of the Income Tax, 81 REV. ECON. & STAT. 674–75 (1999). 
 96 See, e.g., id. 
 97 See, e.g., Feldstein, supra note 95, at 674–75. 
 98 See, e.g., id. 
 99 See Tom Beauchamp, The Principle of Beneficence in Applied Ethics, 
STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHIL. (Jan. 2, 2008), http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/pr
inciple-beneficence/ (last rev. Oct. 3, 2013). 
100 UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW [Vol. 71:83 
 
sensate beings100—then actually caring about the characters’ “frus-
tration” would seem to rest on bringing “Desire or Want” back into 
the picture. Hence, actually objecting to the inefficiencies detected 
by price theory, no less than basing policy judgments on the use of 
welfare economics with its explicitly utility-based framework, re-
quires defining utility in terms of internal sentiments that are actu-
ally felt by someone, albeit unobserved—at least as a matter of di-
rect experience—by everyone else. 
Is the main problem raised by using utility to connote psychic 
well-being the fact that we cannot make interpersonal utility com-
parisons, at least without engaging in unverifiable speculation? This 
was indeed, for many decades—though not as much today—the 
main concern that made economists eager to stick with revealed 
preferences insofar as they could.101 My own view, however, is that, 
just as one can safely ignore the “zombie problem” in all of the daily 
social interactions that fill one’s life—by simply assuming that oth-
ers’ capacity to feel things is generally comparable to one’s own—
so too can we generally ignore this problem in making social welfare 
judgments. Operating under the assumption that people are basically 
the same, in terms of the relationship between their revealed prefer-
ences and the true intensity of underlying mental states, seems not 
only polite and respectful, but also the best way of minimizing the 
potential size of one’s errors in social welfare judgment. Suppose 
that I cannot really know who the relative “utility monster”102 is—
that is, the person with stronger felt pleasures and pains, as between 
you and me.103 Even if we do in fact differ in this regard, albeit un-
knowably, a random guess would make the expected social cost of 
                                                                                                             
 100 See id. (“The . . . rule of beneficence refers to a normative statement of a 
moral obligation to act for the others’ benefit, helping them to further their im-
portant and legitimate interests, often by preventing or removing possible 
harms.”) 
 101 HUGH STRETTON, ECONOMICS: A NEW INTRODUCTION 262 (rev. ed. 2000) 
(“Economists theorizing in academic journals may stick to ‘revealed preferences’. 
But economists working for operators in the marketplace . . . know much more 
about current tastes than the theory requires, and apply what they know in com-
monsense ways.”). 
 102 ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA 41 (1974) (A “utility 
monster” is a person “who get[s] enormously greater gains in utility from any 
sacrifice of others than these others lose.”). 
 103 Id. 
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the error, given the 50% chance that I would get it backwards, 
greater than it would have been had I assumed psychic equality.104 
Accordingly, in my view, the more serious problem with a utility 
framework that frankly avows its reliance on “Desire or Want,” con-
ceptualized as if we had internal utilometers, lies on the introspec-
tive/commensurability side, rather than on the interpersonal compa-
rability side. This will turn out to matter a lot, with respect to the use 
of welfare economics—including optimal income taxation—to as-
sess high-end inequality, when such use fails to reflect appreciation 
of the Mapmaker’s Dilemma, and thus of the need to address over-
simplification and distortion. But before turning to what that frame-
work both captures and misses, it is worth turning to how it typically 
models people’s utility functions. 
B. Main Characteristics of the Commonly Posited Utility 
Function 
The standard economic model of people’s utility functions fol-
lows two main principles. The first is non-satiation.105 That is, more 
of any item is always preferable to less of it, all else equal.106 In 
effect, there’s always room for Jell-O (as a rather revolting advertis-
ing campaign once put it), and indeed for all other goods as well.107 
Under the second assumption, known as declining marginal utility, 
the extra utility that one derives from each extra unit of a given item, 
including the enjoyment of leisure, is always less than that produced 
by the preceding unit.108 The first slice of pizza yields more utility 
than the second, which yields more utility than the third, and so on 
                                                                                                             
 104 Abba Lerner showed that, under complete ignorance regarding who has 
which utility function, the optimal distribution of income—ignoring incentive ef-
fects—is completely equal. Among his key assumptions is that each individual’s 
utility function features declining marginal utility for income, as discussed below. 
See ABBA P. LERNER, THE ECONOMICS OF CONTROL: PRINCIPLES OF WELFARE 
ECONOMICS 10–14 (1949). 
 105 Jonathan Levin & Paul Milgrom, Introduction to Choice Theory, STAN. U. 
1, 14 (2014), https://web.stanford.edu/~jdlevin/Econ%20202/Choice%20Theory
.pdf. 
 106 See id. 
 107 If one can save current resources for future use, the principle of non-satia-
tion becomes more intuitively plausible than it is in a one-period world featuring 
just food. 
 108 Charles I. Jones, Consumption, STAN. U. GRADUATE SCH. BUS. 1, 4 (2009). 
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ad infinitum, even though one is presumed never quite to reach zero 
marginal utility given the principle of non-satiation.109 
Suppose Adam and Beth are each choosing how much pizza and 
beer to buy with the $20 that each has brought to the neighborhood 
Joe’s. Adam might happen to prefer more pizza and less beer, while 
Beth might prefer less pizza and more beer. However, if pizza and 
beer provision is perfectly continuous—that is, if one can fine-tune 
how much of each one buys by fractions of an ounce or less—then 
each individual’s choices will equalize the marginal utility that he 
or she derives from (a) the last unit of pizza consumed, and (b) the 
last unit of beer consumed. Otherwise—say, if Adam faced the pro-
spect of deriving slightly more marginal utility from his last pizza 
unit than beer unit—he would be able to increase his total utility, 
while still spending the same $20 overall, by instead purchasing 
slightly less pizza and slightly more beer. 
An assumption that frequently attracts adverse comment is that 
of consistent rational choice.110 Adam and Beth each seek to max-
imize utility, and thus are presumed to make the choices that, so far 
as they can tell from the information that is available to them, will 
have this effect. Moreover, how one formally presents the choices—
for example, whether one starts with more pizza or more beer, where 
the two can readily be swapped with each other—is presumed to 
have no effect.111 
                                                                                                             
 109 See, e.g., id. 
 110 See JONATHON W. MOSES & TORBJØRN L. KNUTSEN, WAYS OF KNOWING: 
COMPETING METHODOLOGIES IN SOCIAL AND POLITICAL RESEARCH 282 (2007). 
 111 Robin West has memorably expressed the absurdity of this view, if taken 
as a literal representation of reality: 
[E]conomic man invariably knows what is best for himself, and he inevitably is 
motivated to seek it. He knows his own subjective welfare perfectly and pursues 
it relentlessly. He is the infallible judge, for example, of whether he “would pre-
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well-being. 
Robin West, Economic Man and Literary Woman: One Contrast, 39 MERCER L. 
REV. 867, 868 (1988) (internal citations omitted). 
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By now, however, it is not widely disputed—even within eco-
nomics—that as Alfred North Whitehead put it, the assumption of 
perfect rationality is “palpably false: [people] are only intermittently 
rational—merely liable to rationality.”112 Indeed, the burgeoning 
field of behavioral economics explores how people’s choices may 
systematically depart from those one would expect from rational 
utility-maximizers.113 Thus, hyperbolic discounters—like the Grass-
hopper in the parable of the Grasshopper and the Ant—fail to make 
adequate provision for the future, such as by saving for retire-
ment.114 And an addiction to heroin or cigarettes need not be ra-
tional, as the economists Gary Becker and Kevin Murphy posited 
despite its potentially terrible back-end effects, arguing that these 
merely reflected that the benefits were front-loaded.115 
Even those among us who can rationally rein in their own irra-
tional proclivities, in the manner of Odysseus having himself tied to 
the mast before the Sirens were within earshot,116 may be subject to 
manipulation via “choice architecture.”117 For example, suppose 
that gasoline costs $2.50 per gallon if you pay with cash, and $2.60 
per gallon if you use a credit card. Rational consumers who were 
operating in accordance with the standard model would decide how 
to pay based simply on whether the convenience of using a credit 
                                                                                                             
 112 ALFRED NORTH WHITEHEAD, PROCESS AND REALITY: AN ESSAY IN 
COSMOLOGY 79 (David Ray Griffin & Donald W. Sherburne eds., corrected ed. 
1978). 
 113 Colin F. Camerer & George Lowenstein, Behavioral Economics: Past, 
Present, Future, in ADVANCES IN BEHAVIORAL ECONOMICS 3, 3 (Colin F. 
Camerer, George Lowenstein, & Matthew Rabin eds., 2004) (“At the core of be-
havioral economics is the conviction that increasing the realism of the psycholog-
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its own terms . . . .”). 
 114 See JERRY PINKNEY, THE GRASSHOPPER & THE ANTS (2015). 
 115 See Gary S. Becker & Kevin M. Murphy, A Theory of Rational Addiction, 
96 J. POL. ECON. 675, 675–76 (1988) (“Addictions would seem to be the antithesis 
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 116 HOMER, THE ODYSSEY 272–73 (Robert Fagles trans., 1996). 
 117 RICHARD H. THALER & CASS R. SUNSTEIN, NUDGE: IMPROVING DECISIONS 
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card was worth the extra cost.118 But real world people tend to hate 
“penalties” more than they like “bonuses.”119 Hence, it has been 
shown empirically that they will tend to use cash more and credit 
cards less if $2.50 is the posted price but there is a 10 cent per gallon 
penalty for using a credit card, than if $2.60 is the posted price but 
there is a 10 cent per gallon bonus for using cash.120 This violates 
consistent rational choice, unless one makes the model uselessly tau-
tological by positing exactly the degrees of utility from receiving 
bonuses, and disutility from incurring penalties, that would serve ex 
post to “explain” (i.e., be consistent with) the behavior.121 
One question that economists are still wrestling with is to what 
degree such rational choice problems can be domesticated—that is, 
treated as merely special exceptions to the standard model to be dealt 
with on a targeted or ad hoc basis without requiring fundamental 
rethinking.122 An example of an ad hoc correction would be using 
behavioral “nudges” to increase retirement saving, if one believes 
that many people would otherwise save too little, as judged from the 
standpoint of their “true” preferences or welfare.123 
Going down this path raises the question of exactly where to 
stop. It also suggests more modestly reformulating continued reli-
ance on a revealed preferences framework on merely institutional 
grounds.124 Even granting the pervasiveness of rationality problems, 
an individual may generally have both the strongest incentive of an-
yone to act in her own self-interest and the best particularized “lo-
cal” knowledge of anyone—other than, perhaps, intimates—regard-
ing her actual preferences and circumstances. However, even if 
these considerations strongly support a social or political rule of 
                                                                                                             
 118 See Richard Thaler, Toward a Positive Theory of Consumer Choice, 1 J. 
ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 39, 45 (1980). 
 119 Edward J. McCaffery, Behavioral Economics and the Law: Tax, in THE 
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thumb favoring reliance on revealed preferences as evidence of un-
derlying utility, that is not the same as fully resurrecting the rational 
choice framework. 
As it happens, for purposes of analyzing high-end inequality, 
problems with the rationality assumption are less consequential than 
those pertaining to the basic concept of utility. Again, utilometers 
would make it easy to judge people’s subjective welfare under var-
ying circumstances, and thus to decide when they are best off. Na-
ture has not, however, so equipped us. In the absence of utilometers, 
the concept of utility has both descriptive and normative problems 
that, at least in some settings, can challenge its usefulness as an an-
alytic framework.125 While the literature on these issues is vast, cer-
tain aspects of particular relevance to assessing high-end inequality 
bear noting here. 
C. Descriptive Problems With “Utility” 
Given the potential convenience of utilometers, why do we not 
have them? Part of the reason may be that the brain is a very calori-
cally costly organ to operate. So a “cheaper” design would have evo-
lutionary advantages. 
Our experiencing positive and negative mental states is probably 
best explained as instrumental towards our making choices that will 
tend to favor survival and gene transmission.126 A genuinely useful 
utilometer would have to do more than just tote up current sensa-
tions, which might alone be costly.127 It also would have to project 
the future sensations that one’s model of the world—and of one-
self—predicted would follow from making one choice or another.128 
Making adequate decisions promptly and cheaply, using rough rules 
                                                                                                             
 125 See Amos Tversky, A Critique of Expected Utility Theory: Descriptive and 
Normative Considerations, 2 ERKENNTNIS 163, 163 (1975). 
 126 See Dacher Keltner & James J. Gross, Functional Accounts of Emotions, 
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 128 See id. 
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of thumb, may often be better than aiming to make really good de-
cisions slowly and at a high cost.129 Hence, evolution should not 
have been expected to select for such egregious over-design—and 
indeed mal-design—as equipping us with utilometers, even assum-
ing that our primordial ape brains could have gotten there through 
gradual modification, one step at a time.130 
Our lacking utilometers is nonetheless bad news—or, one might 
alternatively say, liberating—from the standpoint both of describing 
crisply how people decide, and of evaluating what actually makes 
them better-off, rather than worse off. This provides crucial back-
ground for how both economists and those most critical of conven-
tional economics have approached the challenges of explaining be-
havior and evaluating people’s welfare in practice. 
1. COMPRESSION OF THE INPUTS TO UTILITY IN ECONOMIC 
MODELS 
Given how empirically messy, at best, the utility concept be-
comes as an attempted description of reality once we acknowledge 
that people lack utiles and utilometers, economists have unsurpris-
ingly chosen to use models that employ radical simplification.131 
Again, recall the basic price theory model in which utility, under 
fixed preferences, results solely from consuming market goods plus 
leisure, and is subject to non-satiation and declining marginal util-
ity.132 Nothing else matters in the basic model.133 
Taken as a literal representation of reality, this model is so re-
ductionist as to be absurd. Obviously, there is so much more that 
affects how we feel about ourselves and about our lives. For exam-
ple, we are intensely social creatures who care about status and rel-
ative position.134 What is more, our preferences clearly are change-
able, whether it be habituating to a different-sized house, developing 
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a taste for expensive wines, or gaining/losing tolerance for harsh 
winters.135 
Yet, there are three main reasons why the basic model may often 
be useful in practice—going beyond the fact that it is simple and 
tractable, which would not alone justify using it if it bore no discern-
ible relationship to our actual behavior and internal experiences. 
First, it is plausible regarding the inputs that it considers.136 Even 
non-satiation, while clearly false when considering pizza slices at 
dinner, stands on strong ground in a cash economy where saving is 
feasible.137 How many of us would turn down a higher salary, all 
else being equal? 
Second, in such classic settings for economic analysis as predict-
ing how price and quantity will equilibrate in commodity markets, 
the basic model may offer all that one really needs. For example, if 
one wants to understand how taxing coal would affect coal use and 
overall carbon emission, the model offers a powerful tool both for 
framing the theoretical analysis, and for setting an agenda for con-
crete empirical research.138 The trick, of course, is not to forget that, 
in answering some other types of questions, a fuller and more real-
istic model of behavior and welfare might be needed. 
Third, once one opens the door to a broader analysis, the entire 
framework becomes substantially more open-ended and indetermi-
nate. Thus, consider the evidence cited by economist Robert Frank 
to the effect that, because people care enormously about relative sta-
tus, their well-being depends not just on their own absolute con-
sumption levels, but also on relative consumption levels for “posi-
tional goods,” such as housing and cars.139 This leads to arm’s races 
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in relative consumption, such as house size, funded by all of the par-
ticipants having to work harder just to stay in (relative) place.140 
Frank argues that concern about the resulting negative “positional 
externalities” supports imposing pollution-style taxation on high-
end (or all) consumption.141 He further argues that high-end inequal-
ity greatly worsens these negative externalities, by triggering costly 
“expenditure cascades” as people at the top set ever-higher stand-
ards for the assessment of relative deprivation, making it ever harder 
and costlier for those at lower wealth levels to keep up.142 
Frank’s arguments are clearly important to the assessment of 
high-end inequality. However, once one adds them to the basic 
model, one may also need to consider such ripostes as the following: 
(1) How many people actually care, and how much 
do they care, about the relative status effects of com-
petitive consumption? In the words of a Frank-skep-
tic at the Cato Institute, “I [do not] doubt that some 
people are that way. My own solution is not to have 
such people as friends. But . . . [would] the proper 
thing [not] be to persuade people not to care about 
others’ income . . . ?”143 
(2) Should “other-regarding” preferences of this sort 
be rejected, even if not ameliorable? Suppose one ex-
plains the phenomenon that Frank describes as 
mainly reflecting envy—although he views it largely 
in terms of the importance of social “context,” lead-
ing to an unconscious adjustment of one’s consump-
tion norms based on what one sees other people do-
ing.144 Many would agree that, if racists enjoy caus-
ing the members of disfavored groups to suffer, we 
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should disregard this ugly and hateful preference. 
But “[t]o say that racism should not count, but envy 
should,” seemingly requires further support.145 
(3) What about positive externalities that might result 
from high-end inequality and luxury spending? Sup-
pose we believe that “spending on today’s luxuries 
lead[s] to innovation and higher standards of living 
for all income groups . . . . The wealthy pay extra to 
enjoy the benefits of new goods, which . . . will later 
become inexpensive and widely adopted.”146 How 
can we tell whether this is more or less important 
than the negative externalities that may result from 
high-end inequality and resulting expenditure cas-
cades? 
The difficulties of the broader issues thereby raised, once we 
begin considering expansion of the basic economic model to reflect 
that humans are a highly social species, can properly support ei-
ther—and indeed both—of two opposite responses. A practicing 
economist might reasonably say: The uncertainty and controversial-
ity of these issues suggests that I can reasonably ignore them in my 
work. At least by sticking to the basic model, I hope to illuminate its 
implications for understanding broader policy issues. These are of 
interest not just analytically—in an art-for-art’s-sake way—but also 
because they genuinely are relevant inputs to an overall assessment. 
For example, if one is considering proposals to tax the rich, does it 
not matter who would bear the economic burden of the tax, and to 
what extent it would affect economic output? These are clearly is-
sues that the basic model can help to illuminate. 
A seemingly opposite response, but equally correct in its place, 
applies to the actual or hypothetical policymaker—that is, anyone 
who is trying to determine her overall bottom-line views regarding 
high-end inequality—whether or not she is actually empowered to 
implement them. Here, it would be reasonable to note that these 
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broader issues cannot be ignored, just because they are difficult and 
uncertain. After all, they are potentially very important—perhaps, 
as we will see, dramatically changing the ultimate conclusions that 
one would reach via the standard economic analysis standing alone. 
If the end result is to reduce somewhat the relative policy signif-
icance of conventional economic analysis with respect to analyzing 
high-end wealth inequality, as compared to the input of sociologists, 
psychologists, and happiness researchers, then so be it. There is still 
plenty of need for economic analysis of these issues. The point is 
simply that economists must share the spotlight, more than they 
have perhaps grown accustomed to doing in this era of their preemi-
nence.147 
2. INCOMMENSURABILITY AND ITS BROADER SIGNIFICANCE 
A further, and indeed deeper, set of issues raised by our lacking 
utiles and utilometers pertains to what is sometimes called the in-
commensurability problem.148 Even though we do not entirely lack 
ordinal and cardinal insight into our own preferences, our mental 
experiences often cannot be placed on a single common metric that 
runs continuously from best to worst.149 For example, would I rather 
have a good bottle of wine, feel I did my job well today, find that a 
mild skin irritation has eased, or hear from an old friend? Or, if I am 
thinking more macroscopically and down the road, should I prefer 
the type of life I would have in twenty years, and the type of person 
I would have become, if I undertook a career as a psychologist, a 
popular novelist, a lawyer, or an investment banker? 
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In a pure revealed-preferences framework, incommensurability 
is not a problem.150 If I must choose, presumably I will, thus tauto-
logically establishing within that framework what apparently was 
best.151 Suppose, however, one agrees that subjective mental expe-
rience is what matters, and that choice has merely instrumental 
value—which is, however, imperfect—towards optimizing that.152 
Then the fact that different experiences can feel so thoroughly in-
commensurate further widens the already open door for arguing that 
some types of experiences are actually better than others for the in-
dividual herself. What is more, especially in cases where alternative 
experiences are not simultaneously accessible—for example, be-
cause they would require that one change or develop who one is over 
time—there is extra room for the assertion that some types of expe-
riences are in some sense objectively “better” than others.153 
A thorough subjectivist might distrust such assertions, unless 
supported by hard research evidence of some kind, or at least by 
introspection that one believed was generalizable rather than idio-
syncratic.154 In practice, such claims are often intermingled with 
normative claims that take the standpoint of an outside observer who 
would consider some sources of subjective well-being morally pref-
erable to others, even if all of them could be measured in terms of 
interchangeable utiles.155 Indeed, often the subjective claim clearly 
seems to be offered as backup for the normative claim—unless it is 
the other way around. 
A good example from fiction is Aldous Huxley’s Brave New 
World.156 Huxley plainly agrees on ethical grounds with the Savage, 
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who rejects the highly medicated ease, comfort, and life of superfi-
cial pleasures that a future society purports to offer, saying: “I don’t 
want comfort. I want God, I want poetry, I want real danger, I want 
freedom, I want goodness. I want sin. . . . I’m claiming the right to 
be unhappy.”157 But Huxley also suggests that the society’s end-
lessly repeated mantra, “Everybody’s happy now,” is not really true, 
other than at a very superficial level, as many of the elite Alphas, at 
least, are desperately thirsting for something more.158 Brave New 
World would have been more interestingly ambiguous had Huxley 
been willing to contemplate the scenario where soma and simulated 
thrills actually could “work” for everyone.159 
Even if we had utilometers that gave each mental experience a 
comprehensive hedonic utility score, there would still be possible 
grounds for normatively preferring some types of experiences over 
others.160 But the subjective claim that some types of mental expe-
riences are inherently better than others, for the individual herself, 
would be harder to support in that scenario.161 Hence, incommen-
surability plays an important role in creating space for debate about 
the relative subjective value of different types of experiences and 
lives.162 
Surely the most famous example of argumentation drawing on 
the intuitions made plausible by incommensurability is John Stuart 
Mill’s assertion, in his classic work Utilitarianism, of two closely 
related points.163 The first is that beings with “higher faculties” are 
subjectively better-off than those without such faculties, even 
though they “require[] more to . . . [be] happy” and are “capable 
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probably of more acute suffering.”164 Yet, despite these concerns, 
Mill argues that: 
[i]t is better to be a human being dissatisfied than a 
pig satisfied; better to be Socrates dissatisfied than a 
fool satisfied. And if the fool, or the pig, is of a dif-
ferent opinion, it is because they only know their own 
side of the question. The other party to the compari-
son knows both sides.165 
The proof Mill offers of this proposition is self-evidently false. 
First, people neither know how pigs feel, nor is there any reason to 
think that Socrates truly knows what it is like to be a particular 
“fool.”166 Yet the intuition that one would rather be wise than fool-
ish—even absent a hedonic payoff—is a powerful one, although it 
may partly reflect a mere “sense of dignity”—as Mill admits—and 
egoistic self-identification.167 
Second, and relatedly, Mill distinguishes between the 
“higher”—or intellectual pleasures—and “lower”—or animal 
ones.168 Unlike Jeremy Bentham, whom Mill elsewhere quotes as 
saying that the “quantity of pleasure being equal, push-pin is as good 
as poetry,”169 Mill emphatically asserts that the higher pleasures are 
qualitatively better.170 Once again, Mill relies on the ostensibly close 
to universal verdict “of those who are qualified by knowledge of 
both” to come to this determination.171 
Here, Mill’s proof might initially seem sound, as people capable 
of experiencing “higher” pleasures will surely often know the other 
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kind as well.172 Yet he once again undermines the persuasiveness of 
his argument by denying the relevance of counter-examples.173 
Those who know both and prefer the “lower” pleasures may suffer 
from “infirmity of character,” or have lost their “[c]apacity for the 
nobler feelings,” or may “addict themselves to inferior pleasures” 
despite not preferring them.174 Hence, “[i]t may be questioned 
whether any one who has remained equally susceptible to both clas-
ses of pleasures, ever knowingly and calmly preferred the 
lower . . . .”175 
The previous proposition is, of course, tautologically correct if 
no possible counter-example would count. But a proof so circular 
and automatically self-validating is no proof at all. Still, the fact that 
different types of experiences may feel so incommensurate can 
make this type of argumentation not only non-falsifiable, but even—
albeit as a matter of personal taste—intuitively plausible.176 Then 
again, some people today might reverse Mill’s hierarchy and—tak-
ing a dim view of the psychological process that Freud called “sub-
limation”177—insist that the strongest animal pleasures, whether or 
not extending to push-pin, are actually more authentic, more im-
portant to welfare, and/or more intensely satisfying than the intel-
lectual ones.178 
Mill’s distinction, if accepted, appears likely to weigh in favor 
of supporting greater high-end inequality.179 After all, under his 
view, why not deny the “pigs” among us some of their shallow, an-
imal-like, lower pleasures, if the tradeoff is that society can offer 
more “higher” pleasures to the elite who are capable of appreciating 
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them? Thus, consider a poor society in which only substantial high-
end inequality would permit the existence of a wealthy patron class 
that could support the arts. 
Incommensurability can also, however, be deployed in opposi-
tion to high-end inequality.180 Thus, consider the view that personal 
dignity, autonomy, and self-respect are indispensable to leading a 
good life,181 and hence are more subjectively, not just morally, val-
uable than merely satisfying as many of one’s consumption prefer-
ences as possible.182 Dignity and autonomy may be viewed as un-
dermined not just by low-end inequality, which may compromise 
poor people’s ability to achieve the good life, but also by high-end 
inequality, which may promote objectionable—as well as unpleas-
ant—hierarchy and subordination.183 
Similarly, consider John Rawls’ normative focus on “primary 
goods,” which he defines as “things that every rational man is pre-
sumed to want,” reflecting their importance to pursuing a “rational 
plan of life.”184 Rawls includes basic health as a natural primary 
good, and affords self-respect a “central place.”185 Given the im-
portance Rawls ascribes to primary goods’ universal availability, 
they might weigh against tolerating high-end inequality, even with-
out regard to his “difference principle,” which requires all real world 
social inequalities to work to the advantage of the worst-off individ-
ual.186 
3. HABITUATION AND OTHER SOURCES OF CHANGE IN 
PREFERENCE OR UTILITY FUNCTION 
With readable utilometers and enough research opportunities, 
there would be no need for the standard assumption in price theory 
that people’s preferences are fixed.187 One would be able to measure 
whether an individual’s utility was, or could be, greater once her 
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preferences had changed, even if she had no opportunity to choose 
her preferences at any time.188 
Things are more ambiguous, however, in a world without          
utilometers. Suppose there are two alternative states of the world, 
and in each state, people would have distinct utility functions. In 
each state, people would rationally optimize given their preferences 
and budget constraints. The standard model offers no way of deter-
mining whether a person’s true happiness or satisfaction or welfare, 
however conceptualized, is greater in one state than in another.189 
That determination would require a person to choose between the 
two states of the world, based on knowledge about the utility he or 
she would experience in each.190 
Once we allow for the possibility that people’s preferences will 
vary depending on the state of the world, conventional economic 
tools cannot be deployed to analyze the welfare effects of significant 
societal changes, such as in the degree of high-end inequality.191 
Suppose, for example, that Robert Frank is correct in asserting that 
high-end inequality yields substantial negative positional externali-
ties by generating heightened expenditure cascades.192 Then, tax or 
other policy measures aimed at addressing these cascades by reduc-
ing wealth concentration at the top, might improve welfare even if 
they looked highly inefficient within the standard framework.193 
Likewise, if people are happier, all else equal, when they live in 
more egalitarian—or alternatively, in more hierarchical—societies, 
the standard model would not reflect that preference.194 
Habituation, to both good and bad circumstances, raises further 
complications.195 Surveys of self-reported happiness, in a range of 
countries and at different times, consistently reveal that there is a 
large, positive psychic payoff when economic advancement reduces 
preexisting dangers of starvation, lack of shelter or medical care, 
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exposure to violence, and so forth.196 However, the increased satis-
faction from, say, a bigger house and higher-end consumption 
choices appears to be considerably more fleeting.197 People may in-
itially report great satisfaction from improved circumstances; how-
ever, once they have habituated to the “new normal,” they end up 
reporting about the same levels of happiness as before.198 
Then there is habituation to the horrible.199 For example, people 
who have been subordinated may learn to function better by lower-
ing their expectations and finding a way to get along.200 If subordi-
nated from birth, they may be worse-equipped to function in a more 
benign environment than they would have been if exposed to it ear-
lier.201 A proper comparison of steady states may require looking 
down the road, and trying to evaluate how much better or worse off 
people might be once their expectations have changed.202 
The costs of transition to a society that is either more equal or 
less so than the current one, while relevant to the overall merits of a 
change, should not be confused with steady state issues.203 In addi-
tion, when gauging how bad (or not) high-end inequality is, one 
should distinguish between transitional and steady-state causes of 
discontent.204 A number of the literary works that I examine in a 
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forthcoming book suggest that changes in inequality—in either di-
rection—may themselves cause anxiety and social strain.205 Once 
again, evaluating the significance of this may place us outside the 
realm where hard social science, and in particular economic, ap-
proaches can most straightforwardly be used. 
D. Normative Problems With “Utility” 
Should all utility and disutility, without regard to its source, 
cause, or character, count in the same way? Such questions are com-
mon fare in debates concerning utilitarianism and other variants of 
welfare economics.206 Nozick’s “utility monster” is one example of 
a hypothetical that may evoke intuitive unease about counting all 
utility the same, and thereby treating people, in effect, as merely 
utility generators whose separate identity lacks first-order moral sig-
nificance.207 Other hypotheticals may evoke intuitions that relate to 
incommensurability, rather than to interpersonal utility issues. 
A classic example involves the torturer and the victim.208 Sup-
pose a torturer’s sadistic impulses are so well-developed that he ac-
tually enjoys inflicting pain and humiliation more intensely than the 
victim dislikes having them inflicted.209 This may seem unlikely, 
suggesting that, if positive and negative utiles existed, we might be 
confident that the sum total would be negative.210 Suppose, how-
ever, that enough people with sadistic or vindictive preferences were 
watching the torture to ensure that the overall utile count would be 
positive.211 One still might be reluctant to conclude that this meant 
the act of torture was good on balance—even if one would reach this 
conclusion in a “ticking bomb” scenario where it was indispensable 
to saving lives.212 
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A common intuitive response to the conundrum rests on arguing 
that the enjoyment of torture is an illegitimate or unworthy pleasure, 
hence not to be counted as if it were no different than savoring ice 
cream.213 In addition, if preferences are malleable, one might argue 
that the sum total of human happiness can be greater when people 
enjoy ice cream than when they enjoy watching torture.214 By dis-
couraging links between one person’s utility and another’s disutility, 
we can hope to create circumstances where the sum total of utility is 
higher.215 
To further illustrate the intuition, while lowering the thermostat 
just a hair from its level in torture debates, consider racism. If the 
members of one group enjoy subordinating and oppressing the 
members of another group, we might find it psychologically plausi-
ble that, at least on a per-person basis, the pain imposed exceeds the 
pleasure derived. In addition, however, one may have a moral intu-
ition classifying the dominant racists’ enjoyment of subordination 
as illegitimate and unworthy.216 We also know that racist sentiments 
are neither entirely universal nor irremediable, and it may be clear 
that, in the absence of such sentiments, society as a whole can get to 
a better place.217 Hence, there are multiple reasons for declining to 
value the dominant racists’ enjoyment of subjugating others, even 
in the mythical scenario where we are otherwise totaling up all the 
utiles.218 
In the debate over high-end inequality, each side can try to in-
voke the racism analogy in its favor. For those who are anti-inequal-
ity, extreme wealth concentration at the top may be viewed as yield-
ing relationships of dominance and subordination that are not 
wholly unlike racial injustice.219 And even if the poisonous senti-
ments on both sides would not yield to exhortation, counseling, or 
medication, they presumably can be mitigated by reducing the ex-
tent of the inequality that gives rise to these relationships.220 
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For those who are “anti-anti-inequality,” whether or not affirm-
atively pro-inequality, the issue is one of envy—that is, gratuitous 
and invidious resentment of the rich by the poor.221 Suppose that 
someone who was below the top 0.1% would feel good about bring-
ing the richest individuals down a few notches, even if it did nothing 
for her directly.222 Even though her animus comes from “below,” 
rather than from a higher social position, as in the case of a racist 
subjugator, she similarly attaches positive utility to someone else’s 
disutility.223 This might potentially support a similar critique of the 
sentiment’s unworthiness, remediability, and socially destructive 
character.224 
Before more closely examining these rival claims about the nor-
mative assessment of responses to inequality, it is worth noting one 
thing that both claims clearly get right. Each involves position-re-
lated utility, or the dependence of one’s subjective welfare on one’s 
vertical placement relative to other people.225 Only a true naïf—one 
unable to grasp how most people actually think about social interac-
tions—could believe that it is literally true that utility comes only 
from own consumption, rather than also being affected by people’s 
relative positions.226 Of course we have position-related utility, 
whatever the empirical and normative weight—or non-weight—that 
one ends up assigning to it.227 So the question, other than such sen-
timents’ degree of importance in the big picture, is whether any 
grounds would justify differential weighting of particular types of 
position-related utility. 
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1. BATTLE OF THE FRAMEWORKS, PART I: ENVY, DOMINANCE 
VERSUS SUBORDINATION, OR SOMETHING ELSE ENTIRELY? 
The anti-anti-inequality position is best-known as the credo of 
Mitt Romney during his 2012 presidential campaign when he as-
serted that all public political debate concerning high-end inequality 
should be viewed as inappropriate, as it was just “about envy . . . 
[and] class warfare.”228 When asked whether any fair questions can 
be asked about wealth distribution, without them being just envy, 
Romney conceded that it was “fine to talk about those things in quiet 
rooms and discussions about tax policy and the like,” but not, how-
ever, in a presidential campaign.229 
How might one who wanted to justify, not just woodenly assert, 
the case for dismissing envy’s normative relevance go about doing 
so? Arthur Brooks, president of the American Enterprise Institute, 
offers as illustration a comment once made by the pop singer Bono, 
explaining a difference he had observed between the United States 
and his native Ireland: 
In the United States . . . you look at the guy that lives 
in the mansion on the hill, and you think, you know, 
one day, if I work really hard, I could live in that 
mansion. In Ireland, people look up at the guy in the 
mansion on the hill and go, one day, I’m going to get 
that bastard.230 
Brooks then adds: “[P]sychologists have found that envy pushes 
down life satisfaction and depresses well-being. [It] is positively 
correlated with depression and neuroticism, and the hostility it 
breeds may actually make us sick.”231 The solution, he argues, is 
twofold.232 First, increasing mobility for the bottom of the income 
scale will induce people to think like Bono’s American, rather than 
like his Irishman.233 Second, everyone should agree to avoid “fo-
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menting bitterness over income differences[, which] may be power-
ful politics, but [] injures our nation.”234 So, Romney ostensibly was 
right about the “quiet rooms” after all.235 
In his envy diagnosis, Brooks offers all three of the crucial ele-
ments for devaluing the sentiment that he describes: it is morally 
unworthy, remediable, and socially destructive—not to mention 
psychically self-destructive.236 Yet Brooks’ focus is strikingly one-
sided. All we hear about is the person who is staring up from be-
low.237 We do not hear anything about the perspective or the actions 
of “the guy that lives in the mansion on the hill.”238 
What if the Irish grandee does things that earn his downhill 
neighbors’ hostility? Even in the absence of conflictual political or 
economic interactions, suppose he likes to impress them with his 
own social superiority and their inferiority. This would undermine 
all three elements of Brooks’ case.239 We may now feel that the 
neighbors’ hostility is more justified, even if we do not want them 
to actually “get” the grandee. Their side of the dispute may now 
seem less remediable, other than by addressing high-end inequality 
itself. And one could argue that what destroys social concord is the 
high-end wealth gap itself, not just one side’s supposedly gratuitous 
reaction to a two-sided fight over status and power. 
In the United States today, there can be little question that “class 
warfare” sentiments, if one wants to call them that, emanate from 
both sides of the divide between the top 0.1% and everyone else.240 
Consider the ludicrous comments made by Silicon Valley venture 
capitalist and billionaire Tom Perkins, who infamously wrote to the 
Wall Street Journal so he could ungrammatically “call attention to 
the parallels of fascist Nazi Germany to [sic] its war on its ‘one per-
cent,’ namely its Jews, to the progressive war on the American one 
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percent, namely the ‘rich.’”241 To Perkins, apparently, expressing 
even mild criticism of our society’s most powerful group is closely 
comparable to one of the greatest campaigns of organized mass mur-
der in human history.242 
When one considers that, in the contemporary United States, the 
“extremely wealthy are objectively far wealthier, far more politi-
cally powerful and find a far more indulgent political class than at 
any time in almost a century . . . [,] [Perkins’] claim manages sim-
ultaneously to be so logically ridiculous and morally hideous that 
Perkins deserves every bit of abuse” that he got.243 Yet Perkins does 
not stand alone, even in having “his self-censor and/or editor fail[] 
him so miserably.”244 For example, not long before, billionaire in-
vestor Stephen Schwarzman called proposals to tax hedge fund 
managers at the ordinary income rate faced by millions of Ameri-
cans, rather than at special capital gains rates, an act of “war” that 
was “like when Hitler invaded Poland in 1939.”245 The ranks of bil-
lionaires comparing even mild criticism of the super-rich to the rise 
of Hitler also includes Home Depot founder Ken Langone.246 
While even three such anecdotes do not by themselves prove the 
existence of a broader trend, the contemporaneous rise of similar, if 
not always so extreme, anger and fear among members of the top 
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0.1% has been widely noted.247 This has led to a wave of recent ar-
ticles asking such questions as why billionaires are so angry at the 
rest of us,248 why they are so “whiny,”249 and why they feel so “vic-
timized” by political criticism that, as a historical matter, is on par 
for the course or even relatively mild.250 
Josh Marshall argues that political “insecurity, a sense of the 
brittleness of one’s hold on wealth, power, privileges, combined 
with the reality of great wealth and power . . . breeds a mix of ag-
gressiveness and perceived embattlement.”251 He thus views Tom 
Perkins’ feelings, if not his gross lack of tact and proportion in ex-
pressing them, as “pervasive” among the super-rich.252 Accustomed 
to extreme deference in their daily business and consumer lives, the 
super-rich find it humiliating and intolerable that they might need to 
“run to the political class hat in hand”—albeit waving large check-
books—in quest of protection and reassurance.253 
In Marshall’s view, the “sheer scale of the difference” in peo-
ple’s daily experiences and circumstances means that the super-rich: 
live what is simply a qualitatively different kind of 
existence. That gulf creates estrangement and alien-
ation, and one of a particular sort in a democracy 
where such a minuscule sliver of the population can’t 
hope to protect itself alone at the ballot box . . . .The 
disconnect between perception and reality, among 
such a powerful segment of the population, is in itself 
dangerous. And it’s led to . . . a significant radicali-
zation of the politics of extreme wealth.254 
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This critique of high-end wealth inequality relies on concern 
about lost social capital and cohesion—a concern that goes back, in 
the social science literature, at least to the work of Emile Durk-
heim255—rather than on the narrative of dominance and subordina-
tion that may be favored by commentators to Marshall’s political 
left.256 However, both critiques support viewing the “envy” frame 
as unduly one-sided, in the sense of applying armchair psychology 
just to the 99.9%, but not to the 0.1%, and as if in a social vacuum.257 
Wherever one eventually comes out in deciding what normative 
weight, if any, to give position-related utility, it surely requires look-
ing in depth at the entire picture.258 
2. BATTLES OF THE FRAMEWORKS, PART 2: ENVY OR 
CONTEXT? 
The “envy” debate also matters with respect to Robert Frank’s 
point regarding positional goods.259 The critique that the solution is 
to “persuade people not to care about others’ income” is part and 
parcel of the “anti-anti-inequality” dismissal of concern about posi-
tion-related utility.260 
Frank himself, recognizing that “[t]here are good reasons to limit 
envy and other corrosive emotions,”261 responds that the ill effects 
of costly expenditure cascades rest on the universal relevance of 
“context” to people’s utility and broader assessments.262 Even our 
evaluations of temperature rest on the applicable frame of reference. 
A sixty-degree day seems cold in Miami in November, but warm in 
Montreal in February.263 So a person who sees other people’s large 
houses may come to want a larger one for herself, not just out of 
rivalry but due to her evolving perception of surrounding norms. “If 
you respect people’s preferences and they experience psychological 
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costs from relative disadvantage, why shouldn’t those costs be taken 
into account in a welfare analysis?”264 
Whether or not one accepts Frank’s analysis of expenditure cas-
cades and their link to high-end inequality,265 it helps to indicate a 
need for broadening both the descriptive and the normative analysis 
beyond the range of standard economic models.266 After all, at a 
minimum, relative consumption might be genuinely subjectively 
important, and Frank is hardly the first to bring this point to broad 
public attention.267 In 1899, economist and sociologist Thorstein 
Veblen published The Theory of the Leisure Class,268 which set forth 
the theory of “conspicuous consumption”269 and—though less re-
membered today—“conspicuous leisure.”270 
Veblen defines “conspicuous consumption” in light of competi-
tion for status, as distinct from the Arthur Brooks model of envy on 
one side and supposed obliviousness on the other.271 Veblen argues, 
for example: 
In order to gain and to hold the esteem of men it is 
not sufficient merely to possess wealth or power. The 
wealth or power must be put in evidence, for esteem 
is awarded only on evidence. And not only does the 
evidence of wealth serve to impress one’s im-
portance on others and to keep their sense of his im-
portance alive and alert, but it is scarcely less use in 
building up and preserving one’s self-compla-
cency.272 
The key prerequisite for achieving the desired reputational ef-
fects, according to Veblen, is “conspicuous waste,”273 since the main 
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point is to show one can afford it. There is good reason to think that 
this rationale still applies. For example, another anti-anti-inequality 
proponent from the Cato Institute, Will Wilkinson, offers a classic 
Veblenesque example—without realizing it—in the course of ex-
plaining how U.S. consumption inequality has changed since Veb-
len’s era: 
At the turn of the 20th century, only the mega-rich 
had refrigerators or cars. But refrigerators are now all 
but universal in the United States, even while refrig-
erator inequality continues to grow. The Sub-Zero 
PRO 48, which the manufacturer calls “a monument 
to food preservation,” costs about $11,000, com-
pared with a paltry $350 for the Ikea Energisk B18 
W. The lived difference, however, is rather smaller 
than that between having fresh meat and milk and 
having none. The IKEA model will keep your beer 
just as cold as the Sub-Zero model.274 
As Timothy Noah notes in response, “if getting rich is only a 
matter of spending more money on the same stuff you’d buy if you 
were poor, why bother to climb the greasy pole at all?”275 Is the 
owner of the Sub-Zero being stupid, or rather “[d]oes he know 
something Wilkinson doesn’t?”276 Surely Veblen’s explanation is 
partly responsible, even if the Sub-Zero also has practical or aes-
thetic advantages over the Ikea model that a super-rich consumer 
would appreciate even if he or she were the last person on Earth. 
One important thing that does seem to have changed since Veb-
len’s era is the role of what he calls “conspicuous leisure,”277 involv-
ing not just exotic vacations that yield showy souvenirs, but also 
conspicuous wasting of time to show that one need not work.278 
Veblen wrote The Theory of the Leisure Class in an era when 
“wealth acquired passively by transmission from ancestors . . . 
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[was] more honorific than wealth acquired by the possessor’s own 
effort.”279 Hence his use of the label “leisure class,” which adopts 
an identifying feature that would not figure as prominently in similar 
analyses today.280 
The Theory of the Leisure Class predated the era of putatively 
heroic “job-creators” and superman CEOs, who ostensibly do “tre-
mendous” things “advanc[ing] the public good.”281 And it likewise 
predates today’s scions of famous parents, such as Tagg Romney 
and Chelsea Clinton, who like to pretend that the generous paydays 
that fall into their laps reflect their own talents and efforts, rather 
than the inherited benefit of having famous parents.282 Today, what-
ever remains of conspicuous leisure is closely intertwined—perhaps 
even more so than in Veblen’s day—with high-end market con-
sumption, as in the case of a St. Moritz ski vacation.283 
In short, “it is no longer even apt to talk of a leisure class . . . 
conceived of . . . [as] in hasty flight from anything tainted by 
work . . . ,” when “our moguls of the moment are workaholics.”284 
Yet conspicuous leisure’s replacement by conspicuous economic 
success in no way rebuts Veblen’s model of peacock’s tail-style so-
cial competition through one’s interactions with the market econ-
omy. Instead, it further exemplifies the model’s continued rele-
vance, even—or perhaps especially—in a post-rentier era. 
The Veblenesque process of competitive display may help to ex-
plain why the social impact of the top 0.1% has been so great—as 
evidenced by recent years’ intense focus and debate on questions of 
high-end inequality—even though the super-rich often cloister 
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themselves far out of view of the rest of us.285 Consider the experi-
ence of airline travel, which has perceptibly grown ever more hier-
archical.286 Airlines now regularly offer not just first class and busi-
ness class seating, but also premium coach seating categories, such 
as United’s Economy Plus,287 along with as many as five distinct 
boarding groups,288 and multiple categories for security clear-
ance.289 
Obviously, part of the motivation for all this, on the demand 
side, is to purchase tangible benefits. To the seasoned airline trav-
eler, it is good for one’s own sake to have more legroom on a long-
haul flight, and to get first crack at the overhead bins.290 Yet extra 
status seems so clearly to be a part of what travelers with deeper 
pockets—whether their own or someone else’s—are purchasing 
such that the rise of multiple gradations—and of spatial inequality 
in the skies—seems closely related to contemporaneous trends in 
high-end inequality.291 
But is this inference refuted by the fact that people at the very 
top of the income and wealth hierarchies commonly fly their own 
private and company jets, rather than needing to line up even in 
Group 1? Not necessarily if those in Group 1 know about these peo-
ple, and if that in turn is enough to transmit social messages all the 
way down to Group 5, and beyond Group 5 to people who never go 
to the airport or fly. This is the process that Robert Frank has in mind 
when he discusses expenditure cascades.292 Of course, it does not 
rebut the possibility that the general social impact of high-end ine-
quality would be vastly magnified beyond current experience if the 
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super-rich were not as cloistered and sequestered as so often they 
are. 
3. THE EXISTENCE OF BIMODAL SOCIAL NORMS 
One last point worth discussing concerns the question of what 
empirical and normative priors one should bring to a broader analy-
sis. In a world without utilometers, one cannot simply observe and 
record the “facts” regarding high-end inequality’s welfare effects. 
One’s underlying assumptions about people and society inevitably 
will play a role, and one should at least try to be conscious about 
this. 
Since we live in what is still a formally egalitarian age, we may 
all too complacently nod our heads at the famous words in the U.S. 
Declaration of Independence, holding the “truth to be self-evident, 
that all men are created equal.”293 No less might we take to be obvi-
ous the words of the French Revolution’s Declaration of the Rights 
of Man that “[m]en are born and remain free and equal in rights,”294 
although many in the United States might reject the French Decla-
ration’s further claim that “[s]ocial distinctions may be founded only 
upon the general good.”295 Yet history tells us that, however fer-
vently one may accept the case for equality, in whatever one deems 
the relevant sense, given the question “equality of what?”, it has not, 
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at all places and all times, been considered even true on the whole, 
much less “self-evident.”296 
As Wilkinson and Pickett note, “[h]uman beings have lived in 
every kind of society, from the most egalitarian prehistoric hunting 
and gathering societies, to the most plutocratic dictatorships.”297 If 
one looks at the history of civilization, “[i]nequality appeared as 
soon as society was born.”298 Ever since that time, marked inequality 
has been common, often accompanied by social ideals that com-
pared society to a family that is ruled by the father, and that lauded 
the scenario where each individual accepted his or her proper sta-
tion.299 
Yet suppose one looks even further back into the past, rather 
than stopping at the dawn of agriculture and civilization. Prior to 
recorded human history, and for an estimated 90% of the history of 
our particular human species, “people lived in groups in which 
equality was quasi absolute.”300 Go back even further, and for at 
least 2 million years our ancestors “lived in remarkably egalitarian 
hunting and gathering—or foraging—groups. Modern inequality 
arose and spread [only] with the development of agriculture.”301 
Thus, “[d]espite the modern impression of the permanence and uni-
versality of inequality, in the time-scale of human history and pre-
history, it is the current highly unequal societies which are excep-
tional.”302 
In short, while broadening one’s gaze may contradict the two 
Declarations’ seemingly serene confidence that equality is a univer-
sal and indisputable human value, it may in the end support a more 
limited claim.303 Substantial social and economic equality has been 
the prevailing condition for most of our evolutionary history, and 
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thus presumably is a condition to which we became—and may re-
main—well-adapted.304 However, it also appears to be the case that 
we adapted quite readily to hierarchy once the material conditions 
arose to make it feasible.305 Thus, Wilkinson and Pickett—despite 
their strong egalitarian sympathies—agree that “human beings have 
had to develop different mental tool-kits which equip them to oper-
ate both in dominance hierarchies and in egalitarian societies.”306 
And the strategies that we deploy to function effectively in a hierar-
chical setting “are almost certainly pre-human in origin.”307 
Why might all this matter for present analytical purposes? One 
point is simply that we should be modest about the universality of 
our own particular social values—even if, in the end, viewing the 
alternatives that have prevailed at other times and places should end 
up strengthening, rather than weakening, one’s attachment to these 
values.308 
A second point is that, if we value an egalitarian vision of society 
despite recognizing its historical contingency, even as an ideal, we 
should not complacently assume that its place is secure.309 Other vi-
sions could potentially supplant this vision, as they have before. In 
particular, rising high-end inequality sits ill with the egalitarian vi-
sion, beyond even just endangering political democracy.310 
I myself do not expect the imminent return of medieval Europe’s 
rationalization of pervasive hierarchy via the Great Chain of Being, 
progressing by degrees from God to angels to kings to nobles to 
commoners to animals.311 There may, however, be a more modern 
expression of the view that we are fundamentally unequal.312 In par-
ticular, market triumphalism, extreme meritocratic values, and re-
vivified Social Darwinism already can be seen at times to promote 
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the view that “winners” deserve everything, “losers” deserve noth-
ing, and that the former should be celebrated while the latter be des-
pised and mocked.313 
A third, more speculative point relates to the social science re-
search that Wilkinson and Pickett argue supports viewing high lev-
els of inequality as bad for everyone in all sorts of ways.314 As noted 
above, they argue that high levels of inequality have measurable ad-
verse effects on social trust, economic mobility, life expectancy, in-
fant mortality, children’s educational performance, teenage births, 
homicides and other violence, imprisonment rates, mental illness, 
drug and alcohol addiction, and obesity.315 
This contested research needs to be confirmed, refuted, or mod-
ified on its own terms—a process that one hopes is underway. Spec-
ulation about how it might relate to our long evolutionary prehistory 
will not settle anything in this debate. Yet the fact that high levels 
of inequality emerged only with the relatively recent rise of agricul-
tural civilization could provide a plausible intuitive explanation for 
Wilkinson’s and Pickett’s results,316 if they end up being confirmed. 
By analogy, consider people’s generally keen taste for fats and 
sweets.317 This was a highly adaptive trait during the countless mil-
lennia when food was often scarce and famine a continual risk.318 It 
is considerably less adaptive today for people who can access un-
limited fats and sweets entirely at will, and when market forces re-
ward the effort to stimulate our liking for them.319 So we live today 
amid pervasive health problems that are in principle wholly avoida-
ble, but that reflect our being evolutionarily maladapted, in some 
respects, for present circumstances.320 
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Might the pervasive ill effects that Wilkinson and Pickett claim 
are associated with high levels of social inequality,321 if verified, re-
flect a similar adaptive mismatch between our internal wiring and 
our present circumstances? Here the claim would not be that doing 
what you like leads directly to a bad health result, but rather that 
competitive social drivers lead to greater psychic stress in a highly 
unequal society than in the type that prevailed during most of our 
evolutionary history, even if one has the tools to adapt and cope in 
either society.322 While any such view remains speculative, it offers 
a more credible evolutionary perspective than positing so keenly 
that a socially competitive species as our own evolved to derive util-
ity solely—or even principally once the basics are met—from our 
own consumption of market goods and leisure.323 
III. OPTIMAL INCOME TAXATION: THE DOMINANT ECONOMIC 
FRAMEWORK FOR RESPONDING TO HIGH-END INEQUALITY 
A. Overview 
With all this as background, we now can turn to the question of 
how contemporary economics assesses issues of inequality. In the 
economics literature assessing what, if anything, policymakers 
should do about inequality, there is broad agreement that taxes—
along with transfers to address low-end inequality—should be at 
center stage.324 For this purpose, the term “taxes” generally refers to 
such means-related instruments as income taxes, consumption taxes, 
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wealth taxes, and estate or inheritance taxes that are deliberately de-
signed such that a wealthy individual would generally be expected 
to pay more than a poor individual, even if the rate structure is flat 
rather than progressive.325 
The leading economic framework for evaluating the use of taxes 
and transfers to address both high-end and low-end inequality comes 
from the literature on optimal income taxation (“OIT”), founded by 
James Mirrlees, who later won the Nobel Prize in Economics for his 
work.326 Three main points regarding this literature are worth em-
phasizing here. First, it exemplifies the Mapmaker’s Dilemma by 
embracing a narrow framework where only individual consumption 
and leisure matter—making its analysis more tractable, but less 
complete and satisfying, not to mention highly vulnerable to chal-
lenge on intuitive grounds.327 Second, while in some ways OIT is 
quite radical in theory, in practice it has long been thought to support 
only a surprisingly limited policy response to high-end inequality.328 
Third, several leading economists have recently challenged those 
policy verdicts, and argued that OIT actually supports a far more 
aggressive response to inequality.329 However, because this critique 
retains the OIT literature’s narrow focus on just individual con-
sumption, it fails to incorporate what might be the most significant 
objections to high-end inequality, other than perhaps indirectly and 
by proxy.330 
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B. Optimal Income Taxation’s Narrow Framework, and Its 
Consequences 
Voltaire famously remarked that the Holy Roman Empire was 
neither holy, nor Roman, nor an empire.331 OIT does somewhat bet-
ter than this at living up to its own name. While generally not about 
“income” as we most commonly use this term, it is admittedly about 
“taxes.”332 As for “optimal,” OIT involves constrained optimization, 
or being as optimal as one can, all things considered, when the first-
best solution that it identifies is unavailable.333 In this sense, OIT is 
actually about optimizing among suboptimal choices, given the true 
optimum’s unavailability.334 It thus addresses the effort to achieve 
“optimality” in one semantic sense of the word, but not in another.335 
While the OIT literature has burgeoned over time in multiple 
directions, its starting point in Mirrlees’ work goes something like 
this. Suppose that people derive utility just from market consump-
tion and leisure, each of which has declining marginal utility. Since 
Mirrlees employs a one-period model in which there are no savings 
or wealth, other than fully formed human capital, market consump-
tion is funded purely through earnings from work.336 Indeed, market 
consumption and earnings are necessarily equivalent since there is 
no next period for which one might want to save.337 
In Mirrlees’ model, all of the people in a given society have iden-
tical utility functions, and only differ in ability or wage rate, which 
is defined as the amount that one can earn per unit of time or ef-
fort.338 However, these inputs are not directly observable. Ability is 
innate and unalterable, but it too cannot directly be observed.339 By 
contrast, earnings, which are the joint product of ability and time or 
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effort, can be observed.340 Each individual chooses the work level, 
and thus the earnings given her wage rate, that maximizes her utility 
from market consumption plus leisure.341 
We have, therefore, an almost maximally restrictive model, so 
far as the things that actually might matter from the standpoint of 
personal welfare in a complex and unequal society are involved.342 
Nothing beyond own consumption in a vacuum, implicitly in a 
world with utilometers, makes its way into the model.343 This turns 
out to have genuine payoffs in terms of offering non-obvious in-
sights regarding crucial parameters for the design of a real-world tax 
system, but it also eventually proves to be a straitjacket.344 
The model’s analytic purpose is to inform a social planner, who 
not only can observe people’s earnings,345 but also can tax them to 
fund a uniform cash grant.346 Mirrlees’ social planner is a welfarist, 
or one for whom “social welfare is postulated to be an increasing 
function of individuals’ well-being and to depend on no other fac-
tors.”347 He might either be a pure utilitarian, who weighs each in-
dividual’s welfare equally, or either of two varieties of a weighted 
welfarist—that is, one who assigns greater social weight to the wel-
fare or utility of worse off than of better-off individuals.348 At the 
limit, a weighted welfarist might embrace what is sometimes called 
a “Rawlsian maximin,” under which increasing the welfare of the 
worst-off individual in the society by just one utile would be worth 
any quantum of welfare loss whatsoever to better-off individuals.349 
This is called “Rawlsian” because it resembles John Rawls’ famous 
“difference principle,” under which inequality is permitted only if it 
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works to the advantage of the worst-off;350 however, it is not in fact 
identical since Rawls was not a welfarist.351 
Even under the utilitarian approach to OIT-style social wel-
fare—which values greater material equality due solely to its aggre-
gate welfare effects given declining marginal utility, rather than as 
good in itself352—Mirrlees’ set-up could support imposing a 100% 
earnings tax, with all of the proceeds being distributed pro rata, but 
for the fact that this would have disastrous effects on labor supply.353 
In light of that concern, one must trade off the utility gain from re-
distributing resources from high-earners to low-earners against the 
utility losses that result from the tax’s inefficiently discouraging 
work.354 
In general, the OIT literature finds that optimal tax rates, and the 
resulting size of the redistributive cash grant, are negatively corre-
lated with people’s labor supply elasticity.355 The higher this is, the 
greater the efficiency costs of a given tax rate.356 By contrast, opti-
mal tax rates—and the resulting size of the grant—are positively 
correlated with the slope of declining marginal utility as the repre-
sentative consumer’s budget line rises.357 Tax rates and grant levels 
are also positively correlated with the degree of dispersion in ability, 
since the payoff to redistribution is greater if people are further apart 
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to begin with.358 And they are positively correlated with the degree, 
if any, of pro-egalitarian weighting in one’s social welfare func-
tion.359 
Returning to the question of what the word “optimal” actually 
means here, the use of “income” (i.e., earnings) in Mirrlees’ 
model360 is concededly suboptimal, or more precisely part of a 
tradeoff, given its effect on work incentives.361 The ideal solution 
would be to base the tax directly on ability, if only it could be ob-
served.362 And the only reason in the model for taxing earnings—
other than that they can be observed—is that they are a signal or tag, 
indicating or generally correlating with high ability.363 Worse still, 
once we alter the model to allow for more variation between indi-
viduals, so that two people with the same ability might choose dif-
ferent earnings, and two with the same earnings might have different 
abilities, earnings’ value as a signal of ability is degraded some-
what.364 
In principle, under the model, any other signal or tag that also is 
statistically correlated with ability might be just as good to use as 
earnings.365 Indeed, best of all might be tags that combine positive 
correlation of ability with incapacity to be altered, thereby eliminat-
ing substitution responses if they were taxed.366 Thus, suppose that 
blondes—but only undyed “real” blondes—have more fun, and that 
this is solely due to their having, on average, greater earning ability 
than brunettes, gingers, and all the rest.367 Then we should tax true 
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blondes, if we have some capacity to identify them, while subsidiz-
ing people who were born with less fortunate natural hues.368 This 
might then be combined with the earnings tax, if it could not do the 
entire job by itself.369 However, since the hair color-based tax would 
lessen inequality without discouraging labor supply, it would likely 
reduce the level of the optimal tax with respect to earnings.370 
One well-known intuitive conundrum that emerges from think-
ing about Mirrlees’ model is the so-called beachcomber problem.371 
An OIT approach suggests that, “if we cannot make any constructive 
use of taste differences, the beachcomber who could have been a 
Wall Street lawyer is ideally grouped (for purposes of measuring 
inequality) with the individual who actually is a Wall Street lawyer, 
not the one for whom beachcombing is the only option.”372 Might 
they both therefore properly be taxed the same, but for the difficulty 
of telling the two types of beachcombers apart? This concern has led 
to a subgenre in the tax policy literature evaluating whether OIT en-
dorses, in principle, an unjust “slavery of the talented.”373 
While this question is unlikely to arise in practical policy terms 
any time soon, it does indeed indicate that bedrock OIT, by relying 
solely on declining marginal utility from own consumption as the 
reason for concern about inequality, risks backing itself into a cor-
ner.374 Its reductiveness invites deploying against it any and all in-
tuitions that are hostile to the model’s logical implications, whereas 
any possible downside of inequality that might have intuitive force, 
other than from the impact of declining marginal utility, has been 
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excluded from the analysis.375 Given that the full range of our pos-
sible intuitions, including all that lie within the reach of a cleverly 
designed hypothetical, are unlikely to cohere into a single, system-
atic and internally consistent framework, this can have unfortunate 
effects on the inequality debate within economics, as OIT’s post-
Mirrlees intellectual history helps to show.376 
In a widely noted recent illustration of OIT’s tension with pop-
ular intuitions, Gregory Mankiw and Matthew Weinzierl note data 
suggesting that taller people, on average, earn more than shorter 
ones.377 What is more, the statistical correlation probably suggests 
that height is positively correlated with greater earnings potential, 
rather than just reflecting height-associated differences in taste for 
market consumption as compared to leisure.378 This, of course, is a 
real-world example of the “blondes have more fun” example, except 
that it actually appears to be true, and that height is more observable 
than natural hair color.379 Mankiw and Weinzierl offer a specific 
OIT model in which a substantial height tax therefore is optimal.380 
Under the height tax that they describe, “a tall person with income 
of $50,000 pays about $4,500 more in taxes than a short person of 
the same income”—all in the service of mitigating inequality at a 
lower efficiency cost than if one only taxed earnings.381 
A height tax clearly is administratively feasible, and OIT rea-
soning does indeed suggest that it would be a good thing.382 After 
all, it would reduce inequality at a very low efficiency cost, thereby 
permitting society to achieve less inequality and/or less inefficiency 
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overall.383 Yet, not only do we fail to observe any contemporary po-
litical prospect for adoption of a height tax—the fate of many good 
policy ideas—but also, this appears to reflect more than just stand-
ard political dysfunction, such as that arising from interest group 
power and public inattention.384 Mankiw and Weinzierl note the “in-
tuitive discomfort”385 that many or most people would likely feel 
towards the height tax if it came to their attention as a policy option. 
As Mankiw and Weinzierl concede, one reason for “intuitive 
discomfort”386 with the height tax might simply be a prudential con-
cern that policymakers would invidiously misuse discretion to base 
taxes on seemingly arbitrary factors that they could claim were cor-
related with ability.387 However, the intuition might survive even if 
one had more confidence in the political system. It reflects the intu-
itive appeal of horizontal equity, a principle holding that people who 
are relevantly alike ought to be treated the same.388 The height tax 
violates horizontal equity if one believes that height, unlike income, 
is irrelevant to how people should be treated by the tax system.389 
Yet, as Kaplow notes, a welfarist framework offers no direct reason 
for caring about horizontal equity.390 
Mankiw argues that intuitive unease with the height tax reflects 
broader intuitions than just horizontal equity.391 He discerns broader 
public support for what he calls “just deserts theory,” which rests on 
the view that one “who contributes more to society deserves a higher 
income that reflects those greater contributions. Society permits him 
that higher income not just to incentivize him, as it does according 
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to utilitarian theory, but because that income is rightfully his.”392 
This deserved reward ostensibly is exactly equal to what one would 
earn in a perfectly competitive market economy.393 Hence, only de-
partures from market efficiency, as in the case of a “CEO who pads 
the corporate board with his cronies,”394 along with the need to fund 
public goods such as national defense,395 can justify taxing the 
wealthy more than others insofar as one subscribes to the just deserts 
theory.396 
At least in the United States, but perhaps more generally, 
Mankiw is surely correct that the just deserts theory has intuitive 
resonance.397 People may commonly feel that they deserve every-
thing that they earn—which is not to rule out their feeling that they 
also deserve more, or that others deserve less.398 Just deserts theory, 
no less than horizontal equity, might be viewed as partly serving a 
prudential function, here in the sense of weighing against the adop-
tion of policies that would mistakenly pay too little heed to incen-
tives.399 But its intuitive force may also reflect its compatibility with 
heartfelt assertion and argumentation in favor of one’s own self-in-
terest in keeping what one has.400 There is no reason to assume that 
dispelling the prudential concern, in a given political setting, would 
fully dispel the intuition.401 
One further point to keep in mind, however, is that not all intui-
tions need to point in the same direction. Thus, even if one finds the 
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just deserts theory intuitively compelling, one may also have intui-
tions that, though not reflected in the OIT framework, lean in favor 
of addressing inequality.402 Mankiw argues that “the government 
provides for the poor not simply because their marginal utility is 
high but because we have interdependent utility functions. Put dif-
ferently, we would all like to alleviate poverty.”403 He offers no ev-
idence against the proposition that this may reflect a broader egali-
tarian concern, extending not just downwards but also upwards.404 
Nor does he show that any such pro-egalitarian intuition, if it ex-
tends upwards as well as downwards, is limited to addressing depar-
tures from perfect market efficiency.405 
C. Optimal Income Taxation’s Combination of Conceptual 
Radicalism with Apparent Support for Only Modestly Addressing 
High-End Inequality 
As Mankiw rightly discerns, OIT’s focus purely on the marginal 
utility derived from consumption and leisure, as well as its conse-
quent complete dismissal of property rights and entitlement to the 
fruits of one’s labor—other than on prudential grounds relating to 
incentive effects—is startlingly radical.406 It therefore stands at 
some distance, not just from various intuitions that its critics can 
identify, but also from other branches of contemporary economics, 
which sometimes may appear to emphasize incentives to the exclu-
sion of everything else.407 Neoliberalism and the “Washington con-
sensus” of the 1990s, blamed by many for encouraging the adoption 
of pro-market policies that exacerbated inequality based on the view 
that it just did not matter or else would naturally take care of itself, 
are logically associated by many people with economists’ rising po-
litical and intellectual influence in recent decades.408 
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OIT potentially leans the other way. Yet in practice, even insofar 
as it had any significant influence on either beliefs or political out-
comes, this does not appear to have been its main effect, at least until 
recently.409 Instead, if anything, OIT appears to have encouraged a 
trend in recent decades towards adopting lower and flatter tax rates 
that may have contributed to the rise of high-end inequality.410 
This apparent political effect (if one believes it was at all rele-
vant) reflects a key finding accepted for many decades in the OIT 
literature, although more recently challenged,411 to the effect that tax 
rates should be relatively flat.412 The reasoning that supports flattish 
rates is akin to, but less obvious than, that for generally supporting 
lower rates by reason of taxation’s adverse incentive effects.413 
Suppose that, in the absence of incentive effects, we would agree 
under OIT reasoning that income above the mean—or equivalently 
all income, if uniform cash grants were used to get to the same 
place—should face a 100% rate. Why might concern about incentive 
effects support, not just lower rates, but also relatively flat rates? 
The reasoning goes as follows. Suppose we are asking what tax 
rate should apply at $30,000 of income, which is roughly the 50th 
percentile in the United States, as opposed to at $150,000, which is 
roughly the 95th percentile. If incentive effects have exactly the 
same import at both levels, then should the marginal rate at 
$150,000 not be much higher than at $30,000, given the assumption 
of declining marginal utility? While this argument might seem to 
make sense on its face, the problem is that incentive effects may not 
have the same overall import at both levels. 
To illustrate the possible difference, suppose that people who are 
earning at least $40,000, placing them in the 60th percentile or 
above, are in most cases certain to keep right on earning more than 
$30,000. That is, suppose they are not considering—and do not face 
the risk of—having their earnings decline by that much. If we were 
to raise the marginal tax rate on earnings in the range below where 
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 410 See id. at 158. 
 411 See generally Joel Slemrod, Optimal Taxation and Optimal Tax Systems, 
4 J. ECON. PERSP. 157 (1990) (arguing that, “in its current state optimal tax theory 
is incomplete as a guide to action . . . .”). 
 412 See id. at 147. 
 413 See id. at 159. 
146 UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW [Vol. 71:83 
 
they sit—say, by 10% for earnings between $25,000 to $30,000—
this would raise $500414 from each of those higher-income people, 
without having any effect on their marginal incentives. 
It is not that they would not notice. After all, each of them would 
be $500 poorer, disregarding what the government did with the 
money. But their marginal incentives, regarding how much they 
would get to keep out of the last dollar they earned or the next one 
they might earn, would be wholly unaffected by this tax increase. 
Accordingly, a marginal rate increase for earnings in the range from 
$25,000 to $30,000 would be “free money” in efficiency terms—
though not, of course in distributional terms—so far as all of these 
people were concerned.415 
Now suppose instead that we are considering raising the mar-
ginal tax rate at around $150,000 of income. Just as in the case where 
we do it at around $30,000, (1) some people are wholly unaffected 
because their earnings are certain to be lower, (2) others have their 
marginal incentives unaffected because their earnings are certain to 
be higher, and (3) still others are right at the range where it affects 
their marginal incentives. Only because we are looking at the 90th 
percentile, rather than the 50th percentile, the members of Group 2 
out of the above three, which provides “free money” in efficiency 
terms, is far smaller. Accordingly, the tax rate increase at $150,000 
may likely provide far less “free money,” relative to the marginal 
distortionary effects, than the tax rate increase at $30,000. 
For convenience, since I will be referring to this point again, let 
us call it the “relative margins” argument. As described here, it 
pushes against marginal rate graduation, just as declining marginal 
utility pushes in favor of such graduation.416 The exact effect on a 
given OIT analysis depends on, among other things, exactly how 
people are distributed across the range of actual and anticipated po-
tential earnings.417 However, the net result, in many OIT analyses, 
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has been to suggest that the overall rate structure should be 
roughly—even if not precisely—flat.418 
Lest this not already sound neoliberal enough, despite OIT’s 
seemingly radical starting point, there is more. As Joel Slemrod 
notes, “raising the marginal tax at the [very] top [to] above zero [per-
cent] distorts the labor supply decision of the highest earner [to his 
or her detriment] but raises no revenue.”419 Accordingly, it has long 
been an accepted consequence of OIT reasoning that, at least “pre-
cisely at the top,” the marginal tax rate should actually be zero.420 
Indeed, this conclusion is logically irrefutable if one is a strict wel-
farist who views utility as depending solely on one’s own consump-
tion, and who assumes that high-end inequality does not yield any 
negative externalities.421 After all, under these assumptions any pos-
itive rate at the very top of the distribution—assuming that the indi-
vidual who sits there can fine-tune his work-versus-leisure tradeoff 
to the very last penny—would reduce the highest earner’s utility 
without having any positive effect on anyone else, since zero reve-
nue is raised.422 
This is not, however, the only respect in which OIT and related 
contemporary literatures have at least arguably weighed against 
adopting policies that would involve aggressively addressing high-
end inequality.423 The optimal tax literature more generally—which, 
unlike OIT, actually does look at taxing income generally, rather 
than just earnings—has been widely viewed as suggesting that re-
turns to saving generally should not be taxed.424 Instead, for a while 
there appeared to be an emergent consensus not limited to more con-
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servative or anti-anti-inequality writers, to the effect that only con-
sumption should be taxed, as opposed to capital income or wealth or 
inheritance.425 
The consumption taxes that this literature contemplated would 
impose progressive rates, set at the individual level, that were based 
on one’s overall consumption for the year or some longer period.426 
Thus, they would not have the built-in, stand-alone regressivity of 
existing retail sales and value-added taxes, which cannot reasonably 
have their rates vary depending on who the purchaser is.427 This de-
sign feature supports the possibility that a progressive consumption 
tax might actually, in practice, end up doing more to address high-
end inequality than does the existing income tax, which of course 
has notorious gaps.428 But the seemingly emerging quasi-consensus 
of ten years ago did indeed involve rejecting, at a minimum, the the-
oretical merits of tax instruments that, by addressing capital income 
or wealth or inheritance, would appear to be especially directed 
against high-end inequality.429 
There were several rationales for this quasi-consensus. One was 
the notion that taxing savings—the source of capital income and 
wealth—arbitrarily disfavors people who happen to have a taste for 
consuming later in life, rather than earlier, or else for leaving money 
to their children.430 In addition, economic models commonly as-
sumed that “individuals make consistent rational decisions . . . 
across very long horizons,” and that “rational intertemporal decision 
making not only holds for entire lifetimes, but extends across dyn-
asties.”431 These assumptions yielded the conclusion that taxing sav-
ings in any way would yield very high levels of distortion over time 
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that seemed pointless if differences in ability were the central distri-
butional concern, and if savings decisions were unrelated to address-
ing this.432 
Suppose one is a welfarist who believes that high-end inequality 
truly is undesirable, but that its only relevant harm relates to declin-
ing marginal utility as one’s budget line rises. Then the conclusion 
that, under a properly conducted OIT analysis, there is neither a 
good case for high marginal rates at the top, nor one for using any 
tax instruments that directly address savings, wealth, or inheritance, 
would, while perhaps disappointing, have to be accepted.433 After 
all, one cannot always do all the things that one would like, at a cost 
that one considers worth bearing. So one who held these views 
might purse her lips sadly at the thought of all the lost utility from 
wealth-holding’s being heavily skewed towards the top, and yet still 
conclude that relatively little could or should be done about it. 
D. OIT’s Arguable Consistency with Significantly More Pro-
Egalitarian Policy Outcomes 
It is fair to say that the above quasi-consensus, even insofar as it 
ever held true, no longer does. For example, in recent years, three 
prominent and indeed “A-list” economists—Nobelist Peter Dia-
mond, possible future Nobelist Emmanuel Saez, and Thomas 
Piketty—have written a series of articles arguing two main points 
about the real-world implications of OIT—and optimal tax models 
more generally—for addressing high-end inequality.434 The first is 
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that marginal tax rates should be steeply graduated, and indeed 
should probably exceed 70% at the top of the U.S. income distribu-
tion.435 The second is that capital income and inheritances should be 
taxed, with optimal high-end tax rates in a well-designed estate tax 
possibly exceeding 50%.436 Let us review the main issues in dispute 
between this work and prior literature in economics, before turning 
to some general conclusions about where it leaves the debate con-
cerning high-end inequality. 
1. IS THE “RELATIVE MARGINS” ARGUMENT STATISTICALLY 
CORRECT? 
Peter Diamond and Emmanuel Saez dismiss the real world rele-
vance of the “relative margins” argument for the flattish rates de-
scribed above.437 The issue is a purely quantitative one.438 The view 
that the ratio between revenue potential and marginal economic dis-
tortion continues to worsen as one moves up the scale from middle 
to higher income is most likely to be correct if, within this range, 
people’s potential incomes—those they would earn if not dissuaded 
by the incentive effects of the tax—follow a normal distribution, 
similar to that on the right-hand side of a Bell curve.439 Diamond 
and Saez argue, however, that there is in fact an extreme concentra-
tion of earning ability at the very top.440 This means that, even if tax 
rates at the top have marginal incentive effects on most of the in-
come that, if earned, would be subject to them—in contrast to its 
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“free money” efficiency character on income at lower ranges—this 
is offset by the fact that the revenue stakes at the top are so huge.441 
One can actually now do a lot, through higher rates at the top, to 
fund government spending that benefits everyone else.442 The gen-
erally accepted effect on an OIT model, if Diamond and Saez are 
right about the concentration of earning ability at the top, would be 
to push it back towards exhibiting the degree of rate graduation that 
would have followed from looking just at declining marginal util-
ity.443 
However, their empirical claim about the distribution of earning 
ability—unlike their analysis of how it would affect the application 
of the model—is disputed. Mankiw, Weinzierl, and Yagan note that 
others disagree about the degree to which potential earning power is 
concentrated at the top of the distribution.444 Because the dispute 
concerns potential income—and even the distribution of actual in-
come is somewhat disputed—they argue that, as a matter of sound 
econometrics, it is very hard to determine who is right and that 
“[e]stimating the distribution of ability is a task fraught with per-
ils.”445 
2. ASSUMED GOAL OF REVENUE MAXIMIZATION WITH RESPECT 
TO HIGH-INCOME TAXPAYERS 
Diamond and Saez assert that the sole “goal of the marginal rates 
on very high incomes is to get revenue in order to hold down taxes 
on lower earners.”446 This increases social welfare, all else equal, 
due to differences between the two groups in the marginal utility of 
own consumption.447 Given the lack of any other asserted reasons 
for addressing high-end inequality, such as the view that it results in 
imposing negative externalities on the bottom 99.9%, Diamond and 
Saez believe that one should never deliberately impose a higher-
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than-revenue-maximizing rate, or one that is on the wrong (i.e., 
right-hand) side of a properly drawn Laffer curve.448 
In a standard OIT model, the marginal utility gain that is made 
possible by extracting tax revenues from the people at the very top 
must be traded off against the utility loss to those individuals them-
selves.449 Diamond and Saez agree with this approach in principle, 
but argue that it is irrelevant in practice.450 “Because the government 
values redistribution, the social marginal value of consumption for 
top-bracket tax filers is small relative to that of the average person 
in the economy, . . . and as a first approximation can be ignored.”451 
Note the carefully chosen words, “social marginal value,” as dis-
tinct from “personal marginal value.”452 As is further made clear by 
the reference to the government’s valuing redistribution, Diamond 
and Saez leave room for accepting their conclusion based at least in 
part on weighted welfarism.453 However, they also assert that the 
adverse marginal utility effects at the top are so small that “as a first 
approximation [they] can be ignored” even if one is engaged in a 
purely utilitarian analysis, under which everyone’s utility counts the 
same.454 They support this claim by noting that, under “commonly 
used specification[s] in optimal tax models,” the marginal utility of 
consumption for people at the average income level for the top 1%—
which was $1.364 million in 2007—is so close to zero that one could 
pretty much treat it as such.455 
Is this how people earning income at that level actually think 
about their own marginal utility of a dollar? One suspects not. 
Forbes journalist Rich Karlgaard notes that even people with a net 
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worth of, say, $100 million—which, at a 5% interest rate would 
yield almost four times the median income level that Diamond and 
Saez identify—often travel in circles that may cause this wealth 
level to feel subjectively as if it is not quite enough: 
$100 million is really a ‘tweener number: You can be 
Richie Rich among your upper-middle-class friends 
or a hanger-on in the superrich crowd. Choose the 
latter and prepare to have your ego smashed. You’d 
surely have to give up the Aspen and Maui homes or 
replace the Citation X [all affordable, along with a 
New York home, at the $500 million level] with a 
fractional jet-ownership.456 
Easy though it may be to mock this, or to assign such preferences 
a low social valuation, I see no reason to doubt its subjective reality 
in the minds of people who live in those rarefied circles. 
There is also something paradoxical about assuming that the rea-
son we can take money from the super-rich is that they do not actu-
ally care more than minimally. If it were true that they do not much 
care, one might expect that they would not object strongly, in the 
political process or otherwise, to proposed large increases in their 
marginal tax rates.457 After all, even insofar as they like high pre-tax 
incomes in order to keep score—in a “keeping-up-with-the-Joneses” 
sense458—in their status competitions with each other, subjecting all 
of them to the same set of high tax rates would leave the rank order 
among them unchanged.459 For example, my $50 million salary is 
greater than your $40 million salary, if we are using them to keep 
score, whether our tax rates are very low or very high.460 
Diamond and Saez, following standard practice, define how 
much the super-rich would care about high taxes purely in terms of 
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the marginal utility of lost consumption.461 Yet, given that marginal 
utility cannot be observed—and that full-blown utiles literally do 
not exist—it is hard to dismiss outright other evidence that they do 
care—and indeed, as we saw above, in some cases care enough to 
start throwing around Hitler analogies.462 
A natural explanation for the apparent disconnect between how 
little the super-rich arguably “should” care, and how much they ap-
parently do care, might focus on the issue of position-related utility 
as between them and everyone else who sits below. Yet this expla-
nation, whatever its overall effect on the case for high tax rates at 
the top, clearly undermines the view that we can get at what really 
matters to people by focusing exclusively on utility from own con-
sumption.463 
Even if we look just at utility from own consumption, it is hard 
to be as confident as Diamond and Saez regarding where a utilitarian 
analysis would actually lead. For example, even if a poor person 
thinks that a million dollars would be an amazing fortune, a person 
whose income is at that level may experience having to forgo things 
that he or she wants but feels unable to afford—say, business class 
seating on all non-reimbursed transcontinental flights.464 The cost of 
satisfying one’s subjective wants may rise with one’s wallet.465 
In addition, as Mankiw, Weinzierl, and Yagan point out, a num-
ber of studies suggest that the case for very high rates at the top tends 
to be undermined by “interpersonal heterogeneity along dimensions 
other than ability, such as preferences for consumption and lei-
sure.”466 Insofar as people in the top 0.1% generally like market con-
sumption more, and leisure less, than the people who would benefit 
financially if these individuals paid more taxes, the analysis of rela-
tive utility may change significantly.467 
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3. SEVENTY PERCENT (OR SO) TOP RATE AS REVENUE-
MAXIMIZING 
Since the only purpose served by high tax rates at the top, ac-
cording to Diamond and Saez, is to maximize the revenue raised for 
everyone else’s benefit,468 the recommended 70% rate would de-
cline significantly if it turned out to be well past the peak of the Laf-
fer curve.469 By contrast, while tax elasticity at the top should matter 
under any sensible analysis, this implication is not so clear if one 
also is seeking to address negative externalities from high-end 
wealth concentration.470 Consider pollution taxes, which unambigu-
ously respond to externalities.471 They may properly be set above 
the revenue-maximizing level if that is what the harm measure indi-
cates, given the relevance of reducing the harm caused by pollut-
ers.472 
Diamond and Saez argue that there is a strong case for so high a 
revenue-maximizing rate as 70%,473 even though this may signifi-
cantly exceed the peak of the Laffer curve under present law.474 Di-
amond and Saez note the ample opportunities that wealthy taxpayers 
now have to engage in legal tax avoidance or even illegal evasion.475 
Substantial base-broadening in the income tax, plus tougher anti-tax 
planning rules and better enforcement could change things so that 
labor supply—rather than tax planning—was the chief available 
margin for significantly reducing one’s tax liability.476 The best cur-
rent evidence concerning labor supply elasticity suggests that it is 
actually rather low, and thus plausibly in line with their 70% esti-
mate of the revenue peak.477 
They concede that this evidence mainly pertains to short-term 
labor supply responses, as in the case where Congress changes the 
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tax rate applying to millions of people who are already in mid-ca-
reer, and thus on relatively fixed paths.478 Even if I do not, say, 
choose to start earning much less in my ongoing career as a CEO, 
brain surgeon, or law firm partner, if the tax rate goes up a bit, this 
does little to tell us about tax rates’ impact over a long time frame 
on “long-run responses through education and career 
choices . . . .[We] unfortunately have little compelling empirical ev-
idence to assess whether taxes affect earnings through those long-
run channels.”479 
Fair-minded though this concession is, it helps to show how little 
we still know about the OIT model’s actual long-term implications 
for addressing high-end inequality. Uncertainty about the long-term 
labor supply effects of high tax rates therefore lends support to the 
conclusion by Mankiw, Weinzierl, and Yagan that, even just within 
the narrow contours of OIT, much still remains “open to debate.”480 
4. THE CASE FOR TAXING CAPITAL INCOME IN GENERAL, AND 
INHERITANCE IN PARTICULAR 
Diamond and Saez stand on considerably firmer ground in chal-
lenging the quasi-consensus in prior optimal tax literature to the ef-
fect that neither capital income nor wealth nor inheritances should 
be taxed.481 As they mention, there is a great deal of empirical evi-
dence contradicting the standard claim that “individuals make con-
sistent rational decisions . . . across very long horizons.”482 They 
also note that high savings might be positively correlated with abil-
ity,483 which might make it useful as a tag, possibly without arousing 
the same intuitive objections as a height tax.484 Moreover, there is 
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rather than being capitalized and recovered more slowly. In economic terms, this 
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no dispute in the literature that some bequest motives, such as leav-
ing behind “accidental bequests” by reason of precautionary saving 
that one turned out not to need, provides efficiency grounds for tax-
ing bequests,485 even wholly setting aside any possible concern 
about persistent high-end wealth inequality and/or the rise of a ren-
tier society.486 
E. Placing OIT in a Broader Context 
Diamond and Saez are to be commended for enriching the eco-
nomics literature by convincingly showing that OIT might support 
doing far more to address high-end inequality than had previously 
been widely assumed.487 From a broader perspective, however, their 
contribution offers a classic example of the Mapmaker’s Dilemma 
at work.488 On the one hand, it made perfect sense for them to stay 
within the literature’s standard parameters, where their expertise 
lies, rather than trying to identify everything under the sun that 
might be relevant—or even crucial—to assessing what policymak-
ers should do with respect to high-end inequality.489 Perhaps, in fol-
low-up work, they or someone else could take a further stab at in-
corporating broader considerations into the analysis. This, however, 
would be a separate project, and the one they pursued in their 2011 
article has substantial intellectual value even standing alone. 
On the other hand, if we as a society are trying to decide how to 
respond to rising high-end inequality, it would be foolish to feel 
bound by their self-imposed restrictions.490 A model in which only 
the marginal utility derived by the super-rich and others from own 
                                                                                                             
would be a consumption tax, yet it does not require distinguishing between capital 
income and labor income. See, e.g., Shaviro, Replacing the Income Tax, supra 
note 426, at 93–94. 
 485 See Diamond & Saez, supra note 31, at 179. 
 486 Piketty and Saez use an optimal tax model to support estate tax rates that 
might exceed 60% at the top. See generally Piketty & Saez, Optimal Inheritance 
Taxation, supra note 434. They note that the optimal rate might be higher if the 
social welfare function reflects meritocratic preferences, and thus assigns higher 
weight to the welfare of people who receive little by way of inheritance. See id. 
 487 See Diamond & Saez, supra note 31, at 184. 
 488 See Williamson, supra note 32. 
 489 See Diamond & Saez, supra note 31, at 166–67. 
 490 See id. at 166 (describing the general limitations of a model as “a limited 
picture of reality.”). 
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consumption is deemed relevant, and in which position-related util-
ity is disregarded—even though, without it, the intensity of today’s 
political wars over taxing the rich would make no sense—cannot 
reasonably be viewed as offering the final word.491 One needs to 
supplement it with other inputs, both empirical and normative.492 
The idea that own consumption is all that really matters in as-
sessing high-end inequality would be a lot more compelling if each 
individual lived on a separate planet, consuming available resources 
but neither seeing nor interacting socially with anyone else. In that 
type of a science fiction scenario, a benevolent social planner might 
have little to think about, beyond the question of where the resources 
that she could fit onto her spaceship—assuming it could hold cargo, 
but not passengers—would create the greatest amount of happiness. 
But for human beings living in densely packed and heterogeneous 
societies on the planet Earth, this is an amazingly blinkered, reduc-
tive, and incomplete way of defining the relevant considerations. 
Suppose that adding position-related utility to the analysis would 
indeed support doing more to reduce high-end inequality than seems 
appropriate in the separate-planets scenario, where people only care 
about utility from own consumption. Then favoring weighted wel-
farism, in lieu of utilitarianism, might be viewed as a very rough 
proxy for all that has been left out.493 After all, if one lucked out in 
deciding just how much extra weighting at the bottom to apply, one 
might succeed in approximating the end point that one would have 
                                                                                                             
 491 See id. 
 492 See id. 
 493 Leaving any such considerations aside, there is something paradoxical 
about assigning extra weight, within a welfarist social welfare function, to utility 
enjoyed by the worst-off individuals. In effect, this treats utility as if it could itself 
be subject to declining marginal utility. Rawls famously argued that applying in-
finite risk aversion from behind the veil might support giving absolute priority to 
the relevant interests of the worst-off individual. See RAWLS, supra note 184; 
LOUIS KAPLOW, THE THEORY OF TAXATION AND PUBLIC ECONOMICS 372 (2008). 
But a rational choice framework would more logically support maximizing ex-
pected utility from behind the veil, and applying risk aversion only as an applica-
tion of this metric for items that have declining marginal utility. See generally 
KAPLOW, supra note 493, at 370–72; Harsanyi, supra note 223; John C. Harsanyi, 
Cardinal Welfare, Individualistic Ethics, and Interpersonal Comparisons of Util-
ity, 63 J. POL. ECON. 309 (1955). 
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reached by counting everything that matters, without differential 
weighting.494 
Yet, this cannot fully compensate for directly taking proper ac-
count of everything that matters. For example, whereas weighted 
welfarism, in a framework based purely on utility from own con-
sumption, would never counsel adopting high-end tax rates that lie 
above the peak of the Laffer curve,495 high negative externalities 
might get one there.496 In addition, using differential weighting, in 
lieu of directly considering everything that matters, tends to focus 
analysis and debate on the wrong variable. If we care about position-
related utility, surely we ought to think about it directly, rather than 
employing an arbitrary weighting convention instead. 
OIT’s incompleteness in addressing everything that matters 
about high-end inequality makes clear the need for other inputs to 
one’s analysis.497Some of these issues may lie within the reach of 
hard social science literatures outside public economics—for exam-
ple, in political science studies regarding policymakers’ responsive-
ness to the interests and concerns of the bottom 99.9%.498 Yet we 
also must consider “soft” information that sheds further light on how 
societies with greater or lesser degrees of high-end inequality might 
feel on the ground—as well as on one’s own underlying moral sen-
timents. 
 
                                                                                                             
 494 See, e.g., Piketty & Saez, Optimal Taxation, supra note 434, at 70. 
 495 However, in a standard OIT framework where one has incomplete infor-
mation about potential revenue yields, one might adopt high-end tax rates that 
have a chance of being too high. See Diamond & Saez, supra note 31, at 182–83. 
 496 See generally Griffith, supra note 193, at 1387–88. 
 497 See Diamond & Saez, supra note 31, at 166. 
 498 See, e.g., Fennell & McAdams, supra note 324, at 1085 n.101. 
